



**Seeking a New Balance:
A Study of American and European
Public Attitudes on Transatlantic Issues**

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Executive Summary

The United States and Europe are in the process of redefining their relationship in the light of two major changes: the end of the Cold War and the development of the European Union. This process of redefinition has generated tensions as well as emerging themes of consensus in a variety of areas including: the general nature of the European-American relationship, the question of power-sharing and burden sharing, NATO enlargement, the NATO operation in Bosnia, economic sanctions against rogue states, European-American trade, and the problem of global warming. While much is heard from the policy elite on both sides of the Atlantic, the American and European publics are often not heard on these issues.

To find out more about American and European public attitudes on the broader and more specific issues in the transatlantic relationship, the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) conducted an in-depth study of US public attitudes through a series of polls with 2,747 Americans and focus groups in several American cities. In addition PIPA coordinated some of its poll questions with surveys done in Europe by the United States Information Agency. This provided a rich trove of data comparing American and European public attitudes. In addition PIPA reviewed polling done by other organizations in the US and in Europe.

European-American Relationship

The study explored American and European public attitudes on a number of general issues in the European-American relationship. The key findings were:

- 1. Despite the end of the Cold War Americans and Europeans strongly agree that they would like the US to stay engaged in Europe and would like to maintain NATO.** Section 1
- 2. Strong majorities on both sides of the Atlantic would like the EU to play a strong leadership role in the world and for the US and the EU to have a more balanced relationship,** whereby they act more like

equal partners. Most Europeans feel that the US has too much influence in Europe. Americans show a readiness to share power with Europe, as well as a desire to share the burden of world leadership. However Europeans give a mixed response when asked whether they would be willing to spend more on defense in exchange for having greater influence over European security decisions.

3. Americans feel that the US carries more than its fair share in maintaining peace in Europe and in the world, while **Europeans feel the present balance is fair.** American feelings of carrying more than their fair share are derived from a mix of correct and exaggerated estimations of how much the US is doing.

4. Consistent with their support for a strong role for Europe, a majority of Americans has a positive view of **European unification**—interestingly, more positive than that of Europeans. Europeans overall are divided on the question of unification, with substantial variation between countries. Americans are largely unconcerned about European monetary unification while Europeans are also divided on this issue.

Transatlantic Issues

The study also explored American and European public attitudes on a number of specific transatlantic issues. The key findings were:

1. Solid majorities in the US as well as in Europe are supportive of **enlarging NATO** to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. On both sides of the Atlantic, support is derived more from a desire to be inclusive than from a concern about Russia.

2. For the US, only recently has a clear majority begun to support US participation in the NATO operation in **Bosnia**, as more Americans have begun to believe that the operation is likely to succeed. Strong majorities in Europe have supported participation for some time now. This support persists despite widespread misperceptions on both sides of the Atlantic that the war in Bosnia is still going on.

3. A strong majority of Americans consistently supports the use of **economic sanctions against Iran and Libya**, while support for the **embargo against Cuba** is soft. A majority opposes the use of extraterritorial sanctions against countries that continue to trade with these countries (i.e. the **Helms-Burton and D'Amato Acts**). Europeans are much weaker in their support for sanctions against Iran, but the majority does not oppose them. Some European publics resent the US for the Helms-Burton Act, but others are divided on the question.

4. On the question of **European-American trade**, Americans and Europeans, in a classical case of the mirror-image, each perceive their own side as more open to the importation of the other side's products. The majority of Americans would support a reciprocal lowering of trade barriers, even though a plurality believes, mistakenly, that labor standards are lower in Europe. Europeans are generally divided on the principle of removing trade barriers, between themselves as well as with the rest of the world.

5. Americans and Europeans agree, by overwhelming margins, that **global warming** is a real problem that requires action. Europeans are, however, more firm in this belief and express more readiness to accept significant costs. Nonetheless, on the European-American dispute about the level of reductions required in the Kyoto Treaty, Americans tend to favor the deeper cuts proposed by the Europeans, even when told that the US called for less deep cuts. However, consistent with their government's positions, Americans are not as sympathetic as Europeans to the view that developing countries have significantly less

responsibility for addressing such environmental problems.

Introduction

The last decade of the twentieth century has brought two extraordinary changes that have the potential to dramatically alter the relationship between the two economic giants of the world: the US and Europe. One of these changes is the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Another is the continuing movement in Europe to higher levels of unification, creating the prospect that Europe could some day stand as an equal with the US as a world power.

Together these changes offer both opportunities and challenges. The greatest opportunity is that the US and Europe—now that Russia is largely ready to join in—can once again pursue the post-war vision of a cooperative world order based on international law, international trade and multilateral institutions. The emerging strength of the European Union creates the possibility of a genuine US-EU partnership that could not only serve immediate American and European interests, but could form a backbone for greater global cooperation.

On the other hand, there is the possibility that the Cold War could become the high water mark of US-European cooperation. Without the organizing focus of a clear and common external threat, the centrifugal forces of dissension on specific issues could erode the cohesion of the relationship. The emergence of the European Union raises the possibility that the US and the EU could drift into rivalry for political influence or trade advantages.

So what are some of the factors that will determine this outcome? While these issues are overtly handled in the arena of elite policymakers, there is another set of players that can play a significant role: the general publics on both sides of the Atlantic. In numerous ways, the values of the public and its willingness to accept costs or changes that have an impact on national self-image limit and condition the range of options for policymakers.

A key example is the question of whether the American public is going through a phase of wanting to disengage from the world in the wake of the Cold War. On both sides of the Atlantic, numerous observers have voiced concern that the US public is reverting to the isolationism of the interwar years. No matter how much American leaders reassure their European counterparts that the US will stay engaged in Europe, an American populace that is (or is perceived to be) reluctant to support the necessary costs that such engagement entails will doubtless erode the confidence in the long-term stability of American commitments.

On the European side, Americans see the leaders of European countries seeking to form themselves into a stronger union, with the potential to be a true world power that could engage the US on a more equal basis. But is this an aspiration of European publics? Are they ready to accept the costs of such an expanded role, or have they grown comfortable with American dominance and a junior partner role? If European publics are not behind their leaders, Americans should rightly doubt that, in the long run, Europe will have the staying power to rise to the new level.

If Europe is indeed ready to be a more unified and powerful player, this poses new question for Americans. Do they see a stronger and more unified Europe as a potential competitor, or as a good candidate for sharing the burden of world leadership? Are they ready to see the US have its preeminent position diluted by the presence of an aspiring superpower on the world scene? Are they ready to see the US truly share power with Europe, or even to have US troops under a European commander? Again, the climate for change will be significantly affected by the perception of how these issues play with the

American public.

The public's values also come to bear on a number of more specific issues in the European-American relationship. Climaxing years of negotiation, the US and Europe agreed to invite three new countries into NATO. Some European countries, as well as the US Senate, have now ratified this expanded treaty commitment. However, such a commitment is only as meaningful as the strength of the commitment to fulfill it in the event that a NATO member is attacked. Such a decision will no doubt be influenced by political forces at the time, which in turn will be influenced by public attitudes about risking the lives of troops or even risking a larger war.

In a less hypothetical domain, the US and Europe have contributed troops to a NATO peacekeeping operation in Bosnia. Here again, public attitudes play a key role. Congressional leaders in the US are very sensitive to the possibility that the US public has grown weary of the US commitment of troops there, and many believe that the public will strongly turn against it in the event of troop fatalities. Whether or not such beliefs are correct has substantial implications for US policy.

Another prominent area in which public attitudes can play a key role is in the area of trade. European and American leaders are considering the possibility of reducing trade barriers between the US and Europe. While most members of the public do not follow such trade negotiations closely, on both sides of the Atlantic trade can be a very emotional issue, with many individuals, rightly or wrongly, perceiving that any change in trade relations can have a significant impact on their own livelihood. In both Europe and the US, political candidates have attempted to use such concerns as a platform to build their constituencies. Naturally, the attitudes and beliefs of the public will contribute to a political climate that may—or may not—make new trade agreements possible.

Finally, there are areas in which the US and the EU have come into direct conflict. One of these areas is the use of economic sanctions against rogue states. The US has been a strong proponent of using economic sanctions against such countries as Iran, Libya, and Cuba. EU countries have abided by the UN sanctions against Libya, but have continued to actively trade with Iran and Cuba, and to some extent Libya as well. In some instances European leaders have made the case that there is even a philosophical difference between the US and Europe, with Europeans believing more than Americans in the value of economic engagement as a means of bringing about change.

To put pressure on the Europeans to follow its approach, the US has legislated further sanctions on European companies that persist in trading with these countries, generating substantial tensions with the EU (though the sanctions have not yet been applied, due to Presidential waivers). If the publics on both sides of the Atlantic do clearly line up behind their governments' positions on the use of sanctions, then it would appear that there may indeed be a fundamental European-American disagreement that promises to limit future cooperation on this issue. If there is not, then such a disagreement is more likely an epiphenomenon at the intergovernmental level that can potentially be resolved.

Another area of US-EU dissension has been on the question of global warming. At the December 1997 UN conference in Kyoto, the US called for scaling back the goals for reducing greenhouse gas emissions previously established at the 1992 conference in Rio. The Europeans called for setting the goals higher, with even deeper cuts. A compromise position was worked out, but it appears unlikely that this compromise will be approved in the US Senate.

Here again, the question arises whether this difference between the US and EU positions are representative of attitudes in their publics. Given that the consequences of decisions about emissions cutbacks will be distinctly felt by the respective publics, the question of what American and European

publics believe about the reality of global warming and the urgency of emissions cuts has important implications for prospects of finding a jointly acceptable emissions reduction plan.

To find out more about how American and European publics do feel about all of these issues, the Program on International Policy Attitudes conducted a multifaceted study. To study American public attitudes, PIPA conducted:

- a review of existing polling data on US public opinion
- focus groups in Roanoke, Virginia and Battle Creek, Michigan
- a nationwide poll with a random sample of 2,747 Americans, conducted in three waves, February through April 1998.

The study of European public attitudes was much more limited and consisted of:

- a review of existing polling data on European public opinion
- analysis of polling done in April 1998 in Britain, France and Germany by the United States Information Agency (USIA), using questions that were coordinated between USIA and PIPA to produce comparable data.

Note: It should be underscored that there are many gaps in the available European data. Many survey questions were only asked in Britain, France, and Germany. If all western European countries had been surveyed, there might have been significant exceptions to the patterns found in the big three. Whenever possible, we have included data from other European countries as well. In our analysis, we use the term “Europeans” when generalizing about the available data. A more precise phrase would be, “based on a substantial amount of data—comprising all that is presently available—there is nothing that contradicts the following generalization unless otherwise noted.” We hope the reader will understand that this caveat cannot be repeated with every use.

Chapter 1: The US-European Relationship

The Issues

Throughout the Cold War, engagement in Western Europe was the centerpiece of US foreign policy. The United States served as the guarantor of peace between the European states and took the lead in defending the West against the threat of Soviet aggression. Through its role in NATO, including the nuclear guarantee, the US provided a key element in the security of Europe. But the transatlantic relationship was not trouble-free. Almost from the beginning, there were arguments over the relative burdens borne by the alliance's members, with the United States often accusing the West Europeans of not spending enough on defense. And, as "successor generations" came to power in both continents, and US trade and demographics shifted toward Asia and Latin America, there were European concerns that the US-European relationship might fade in importance.

With the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the future of the transatlantic alliance has gained new uncertainties. Without the unifying glue of the Soviet threat, will US-European

differences overwhelm common interests, or will the US and Europe attain a higher level of cooperation in a world newly receptive to their concepts of a preferred world order?

Burdensharing has gained new prominence in the transatlantic debate, as has the role of a more unified Europe and its ability to share leadership with the United States. Some Europeans have feared that the United States might disengage from Europe and turn inward, leaving the Europeans to fend for themselves. Other Europeans have feared that, as the sole superpower, the US might be domineering and hegemonic over Europe—demanding assistance when needed, but largely ignoring European concerns at will. Americans have feared that the Europeans are still looking to the US to carry a disproportionate share in maintaining order in Europe and in the world, while Europe remains in an unnecessarily dependent position.

Some of the initial anxieties of the immediate post-Cold War period have been moderated by European-American cooperation on a variety of issues such as Bosnia and NATO enlargement. However, the underlying question of what the nature of the European-American relationship should be in the post-Cold War era lies still largely unanswered.

US Public Attitudes

1. A strong majority of Americans supports continued US engagement with Europe to deal with problems in Europe and in the world, and continues to support NATO.

Despite the end of the Cold War, a strong majority of Americans supports continued US engagement with Europe. When respondents were asked to choose which of two arguments came closest to their point of view, a very strong majority of 68% chose the one that emphasized the need to maintain strong relations with Europe over the one that argued for turning inward.

An overwhelming majority sees the importance of US ties to Europe as undiminished by the end of the Cold War. When PIPA asked "Now that the Cold War is over, how important would you say America's ties with Europe are?" only 7% said that the importance of ties with Europe had lessened. Fifty-four percent said these ties were about as important as before, while 38% said that they were now more important.

This does not mean that Americans are oblivious to the significant relaxation of tensions that has followed the end of the Cold War. Sixty-five percent agree that "Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the world has become much safer" (disagree: 31%).

Commentators have frequently speculated that a key trend of the post-Cold War era could be a shifting of Americans' interests and concerns toward Asia and away from Europe. However, trend questions in polls continue to give no sign of such a shift among the public. In the 1994 poll by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations only 21% said Asia "is more important to the US," while 49% said Europe is more important; and 20% volunteered that both were equally important. In the current study the same question was reasked: 55% said Europe was more important, 27% said Asia was more important (both equally: 10%). A similar Pew question in October 1997 found 49% who said Europe was more important, while 31% said "the Pacific Rim" was more important—almost identical to Pew's results on this question in 1993.

These continuing signs of a willingness among Americans to remain engaged with Europe are consistent with many other polls showing the absence of a general isolationist trend. As is discussed in detail in PIPA's study, *The Foreign Policy Gap: How Policymakers Misread the Public*, contrary to policymakers'

perceptions, Americans show a strong and stable support for staying engaged in world affairs, particularly in the context of multilateral efforts. (1)

Support for NATO

Consistent with this willingness to stay engaged with Europe, most Americans have a broadly positive attitude toward continued involvement in NATO. In the present study, 65% said that "NATO is still essential to our security" (no longer essential, 21%). Seventy-two percent said they had a favorable "overall opinion" of NATO, while 18% had an unfavorable opinion.

Support for continued US engagement in Europe is sustained by the sober thought that without it some European countries may well have gone to war. Seventy-two percent agreed with the statement, "If it wasn't for the US presence in Europe, some of the countries of NATO probably would have gone to war with each other by now," and only 22% disagreed.

2. Most Americans would like the US and Europe to play more balanced roles as world leaders and to cooperate more extensively. Americans show a readiness to share power with Europe as well as a desire to share the burden of world leadership.

Not surprisingly, most Americans would like to see the US play a powerful role in the world. PIPA asked one sample, "From your point of view, how desirable is it that the US exert strong leadership in world affairs?" An overwhelming 86% said they found strong US leadership desirable, while only 11% found it undesirable.

More striking, at the same time Americans express an almost equally strong preference for Europe to play a powerful role. To a different sample, PIPA asked: "For the interests of the United States, how desirable is it that the European Union exert strong leadership in world affairs?" Nearly as many-80%-said that strong EU leadership was desirable with just 16% saying it is undesirable.

These sentiments are not really contradictory. An overwhelming majority support the US and Europe being equal partners in dealing with world problems. Respondents were asked: "In dealing with world problems, which best characterizes what you think the relationship should be between the US and the European Union-the US should take the lead, Europe should take the lead, or the US and Europe should be equal partners?" Only 13% said the US should take the lead. An overwhelming 80% said the US and Europe should be equal partners, while 5% said that Europe should take the lead.

Perhaps most striking of all, a modest majority supports the idea that, in a global context, it is even positive for US power to be counterbalanced by a strong Europe (see box below). What is particularly interesting is that this statement explicitly posed a reduction in US dominance, without suggesting any compensating benefit. It suggests that many Americans see a certain value in an equilibrium of power that supersedes their desire to maximize American interests.

Americans' preference for greater cooperation with Europe in dealing with world problems is consistent with attitudes expressed in many other poll questions that show general support for cooperative forms of international engagement. In a June 1996 PIPA poll, respondents were presented with three options for America's role in the world. Only 13% embraced the idea that "as the sole remaining superpower, the US should continue to be the preeminent world leader in solving international problems." Similarly, just 12% chose the option that "the US should withdraw from most efforts to solve international problems." However, an overwhelming 74% endorsed the view that "The US should do its fair share in efforts to solve international problems together with other countries."

Similar results were found in a September 1997 Pew poll that asked what kind of leadership role Americans would like to see the US play in the world. Only 12% favored the United States being "the single world leader." Similarly, only 11% embraced the position that the US "shouldn't play any leadership role." Seventy-three percent favored the US playing "a shared leadership role." When Times Mirror asked the same questions in 1995 and in 1993, similar results were obtained.

Also, a trend question-which has been asked since 1964 to test support for a unilateral approach in foreign policy-was asked most recently by Pew in September 1997. Only 32% agreed with the statement: "Since the US is the most powerful nation in the world, we should go our own way in international matters, not worrying too much about whether other countries agree with us or not."

Support for Greater Cooperation and Power Sharing

Most Americans would prefer to see the cooperative handling of common problems become the dominant style in American-European relations-and this preference holds up for a majority, even when it is pointed out that this might require compromises (see box below).

A strong majority shows a willingness to share power with the European Union as part of joint efforts. "When the US tries to address world problems such as ethnic conflicts, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and environmental issues," 65% said that "as a general rule, the US should work closely with the European Union in coordinated efforts, even if it sometimes means making compromises," while 30% said the US should "pursue its own approach to problems, doing what it thinks is best, even if this means tackling problems on its own."

Americans are also quite responsive to the idea of a 'grand bargain' by which the US would be willing to allow Europeans more power and influence in exchange for Europe taking on more of the burden of maintaining western security. Respondents were presented the following question, adapted from one that USIA has asked in Europe.

One way some people have proposed to deal with post-Cold War security issues is to reduce the role of the US in NATO and strengthen the role of western Europe. This would mean Americans would spend less money on European defense and have less of the responsibility for the security of western Europe. However, Europeans would have a much greater say on issues of western security. Which do you think would be best-keeping the existing relationship with western Europe or having western Europe assume more of the responsibility and control over its security?

Sixty-seven percent chose the 'grand bargain' option of having Western Europe assume more responsibility and control, while 32% preferred keeping the existing relationship.

It is easy to assume that Americans would only be willing to share power as part of a quid- pro-quo by which Europe carries more of the burden. However, this does not appear to be the case. In the poll results discussed in the two preceding paragraphs, when the notion of power sharing was sweetened with the notion of burden sharing, support was only slightly greater than when power sharing was described as intrinsically worthwhile (67% support and 65% support, respectively). Nonetheless, as we will explore below, Americans do feel overburdened, and the desire for burden sharing in specific cases may help to overcome what reluctance there may be to sharing power in specific instances.

Sharing Power in Specific Cases

PIPA posed the question of power sharing in a number of specific instances to determine how much Americans were willing to go beyond the support for it in principle. One such current case was in regard to the Asian financial crisis. Respondents were told:

As you may know, the US and Europe are working together on a program to help Asian countries stabilize their economies. This program will require the US and Europe to loan money to Asian countries, which should be paid back, but will be at some risk. Presently there is an issue about how much the US and Europe will each loan. Another issue is who will have more say about how the program will be run, which could affect whether the loans are repaid.

Then respondents were offered three options. Fifteen percent preferred that "the US loans a bit more money, but has a greater say on how the programs are run." Four percent preferred that Europe loan a bit more money and have a greater say. An overwhelming 77% preferred that "Europe and the US each loan equal amounts of money and have equal say on how the programs are run." These numbers are virtually identical to those in response to the general question, in which 80% wanted the US and Europe to be equal partners in dealing with world problems, while 13% preferred for the US to take the lead.

A more difficult case for Americans is the prospect of having a European be the commander of a joint force in which American lives may be put at risk, as in Bosnia. When PIPA asked whether it would be acceptable or not "to have a European as the overall commander of the NATO forces [in Bosnia], including US troops," Americans were divided, with a 47% plurality finding it unacceptable, while just 44% found it acceptable.

However, it appears that a large part of this resistance to a European commander is not derived from a bias against a European commander, but rather from the assumption that the US would probably be contributing the lion's share of the troops and thus should naturally have the leadership role; because when this assumption was controlled for, a solid majority found a European commander acceptable. Following the above-mentioned question about putting US troops under a European commander in Bosnia, those who said a European commander was unacceptable, or said "don't know," were then asked: "What if the Europeans were to contribute substantially more than half of the troops and the US was to contribute a small portion?" In these circumstances, a third (33%) switched to saying that a European commander would be acceptable, making a total of 62% of the whole sample saying that a European commander would be acceptable at least under some conditions. [Note: This willingness to accept a foreign commander even coexists with a widespread misperception that a significant number of Americans troops are being killed by hostile fire in Bosnia. See the Bosnia section below.]

This readiness to accept a commander who is not an American is consistent with an earlier poll finding (PIPA, November 1995), which asked about the possibility of having the Persian Gulf policed by "a multinational naval patrol with ships from different countries as well as the US." The complexities of this idea were also introduced with the comment, "Most likely, this would reduce the burden on the US, but also would mean having shared command with other countries." In this case, 72% said they would favor such a multinational naval patrol over the US doing the patrolling on its own (US alone: 26%), though it would mean the US giving up exclusive command.

Another case explored concerns Israel's construction of settlements in the West Bank. This appears to be a case in which Americans show little willingness to accommodate European preferences. Since the 1970s the Europeans have been generally more supportive of a Palestinian homeland than has the US. Recently the EU has put pressure on Israel to stop building settlements in the Palestinian areas.

In the current poll we sought to find out how responsive poll respondents were to the information that Europe was making such efforts. One sample was asked: "Recently, Israel began building new housing projects in the West Bank on land that is claimed by the Palestinians. Do you think that the US should or should not put pressure on Israel to stop construction?" Fifty-eight percent said that US should not, while 33% said that it should. Another subsample was given the extra information that "Our European allies have voiced strong opposition to this construction." However, this information did not cause a difference that was statistically significant.

Of course, it should be noted here that respondents were not being asked to evaluate a possible joint effort in relation to the problem, nor was there any burden-sharing quid-pro-quo offered. Nonetheless, it does suggest that on some issues it may be difficult for Americans to accommodate European preferences, even as part of a joint effort.

Rejection of Specialized Roles for the US and Europe

One idea that enters frequently into policymakers' discussions on American-European relations is that of the US and Europe each developing specialized roles. In this perspective, the US would be the sole leader in the realm of security, while the European Union would increasingly emerge as the "great civilian power," using its economic weight to address problems in the world.

When PIPA presented this idea to respondents, however, a majority rejected it. Respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement:

It makes sense for Europe and the US to specialize in their role in the world. Because the US has the strongest military, the US should take the lead responsibility and supply most of the forces when it comes to military conflict. Europe should instead emphasize things like assisting poor countries develop their economies and trying to help reconstruct societies after a war.

Even though this argument was one-sided in that it affirmed the proposal as sensible, only 38% agreed while 56% disagreed. Clearly, the grand bargain by which Europe and the US would become more symmetrical-rather than more complementary-is preferred by most Americans.

3. Among the American public there is a widespread feeling that the US carries more than its fair share, relative to Europe, in efforts to maintain stability in Europe and in the world. This attitude appears to be influenced by a mix of correct and incorrect perceptions about how much the US is doing. In the area of defense spending, the public is strikingly accurate in their estimates that the US spends approximately two-thirds more than Europe-an amount they find excessive. However, the public greatly overestimates the US share of development assistance, contributions to the operation in Bosnia, and UN dues. Most significant, in these areas, the share Americans think would be appropriate is greater than the amount the US is contributing.

Despite the general support for remaining engaged with Europe and the willingness to undertake cooperative efforts, an overwhelming majority also feels that the US is doing more than its fair share-compared to European countries-in maintaining stability in Europe and in the world.

Seventy-seven percent said that the US is doing more than its fair share in maintaining peace in Europe (with 48% saying the US is doing "much more"). Only 13% thought that the US and Europe "are each doing their fair share," while just 3% said Europe is doing more than its fair share. A different sample was asked the same question about maintaining peace in the world. The results were basically the same, with 81% saying that the US is doing more than its fair share (54% "much more"), 14% saying "they are each doing their fair share," and 2% saying that Europe is doing more than its fair share.

The feeling that the US is carrying more than its fair share of the security burden relative to Europe is also manifest, though to a lesser degree, in poll findings that pose the question in more specific contexts. In the present study, PIPA asked: "In the NATO operation in Bosnia-as compared to the US, do you think the Europeans are carrying their fair share, more than their fair share, or less than their fair share?" A two-thirds majority (67%) thought the Europeans were carrying less than their fair share, while 21% thought they were carrying their fair share (more than their fair share: 5%). In PIPA's November 1995 poll, a more narrowly focused question about "the amount that the US contributes to NATO" found a much smaller majority-53%-who thought the US contributes more than its fair share, while 30% thought the US share was about right (less than its fair share: 4%).

Americans show some doubts that the benefits of the US-European alliance are fully mutual. Asked how confident they were that "if our country's security were threatened by some other country, our European allies would help us in our defense," only 14% said their confidence was "very great," while 41% rated it with a more equivocal response of "considerable." Twenty-three percent had "little" and 20% "very little" confidence that they would aid the US. On the other hand, as mentioned above, a very large majority feels that Europe has benefited greatly by US presence in Europe, with 72% agreeing that "If it wasn't for the US presence in Europe, some of the countries of NATO probably would have gone to war with each other by now."

Nonetheless, many Americans see that being in Europe serves US interests. When burdensharing comes up for debate between US and European policymakers, Europeans often argue that the US presence in Europe is not simply altruistic, but largely a response to the national interests of the United States. When PIPA framed this debate in a poll question the European argument did surprisingly well, winning a substantial plurality. Asked to choose between two statements, a plurality of 50% chose the statement, "US presence in Europe has been a way to defend against potential Russian and German aggression. It has served US interests as much as European interests." Only 39% chose the one that said, "Making sure that the western European countries don't go to war with each other and defending Europe against Russia has put a lopsided burden on the US." Thus, for many Americans, though they may feel the US carries more than its share of the burden in maintaining peace in Europe, this feeling can be upstaged by the recognition that the engagement in Europe serves US interests. This should not be read to mean, however, that most Americans do not want Europe to carry more of the burden.

Interestingly, it appears that if Americans had a more correct understanding of the actual size of the EU economy as compared to the US, the feeling that the EU carries less than its fair share would probably be stronger. On average, Americans mistakenly believe that the US economy is somewhat larger than that of the European Union. PIPA asked: "Together, the US and countries of the European Union have much of the world's wealth. I'd like you to imagine the US economy and the European Union economy as if they were one big economy. Just tell me your hunch: out of this one big economy, what percentage do you suppose is the US's part?" The median response was that the US makes up 60% (mean 56%) and the EU 40% (mean 44%) of the transatlantic economy described in the question. In reality, though, the US economy comprises 46% and the EU economy 54% of the US and EU's collective wealth.² In the PIPA poll, those who perceived the EU economy as bigger or as big as the US economy were significantly more likely to feel that the EU is not carrying its fair share.

To find out more about the widespread feeling that the US carries more than its fair share, PIPA examined the perceptions that sustain it. In a series of questions, respondents were asked to estimate the relative proportion of US and European Union spending in a variety of areas and then to specify what they felt would be an appropriate balance.

Perception of Share of Defense Spending

One of these areas was defense spending. PIPA asked respondents to "think about the money that the US and European Union countries, taken together, spend on defense," and to estimate what percentage of this total was spent by the US and what percentage by the EU member states. The median estimate was that the US spends 65% (mean 62%) and the EU countries 35% (mean 38%). This estimate by respondents is startlingly accurate. In reality, the US spends 63% and the EU spends 37% of the combined defense budgets of the US and EU countries.

When asked what they thought would be appropriate proportions for the US and the EU, the median response was that the US should spend 50% (mean 44%) and the EU should spend 50% (mean 56%). This is consistent with the responses to other questions discussed above: 80% said that the US and the European Union should be equal partners in dealing with world problems, and 77% said that in handling the Asian financial crisis, they preferred that "Europe and the US each loan equal amounts of money and have equal say on how the programs are run."

Apparently this correct perception that the US spends far more on defense than the European countries leads to an assumption that the US invariably carries the lion's share of the burden in other areas as well—a sentiment widely expressed in focus groups. As we shall see in the areas of development aid, troops in Bosnia, and UN dues, the American public tends to assume that the US contributes more than Europe, though in all these cases this is not true. There is also evidence that individuals who believe that the US spends more on defense are far more likely to assume that the US gives more development assistance (correlation .50).

Perception of Share of Development Aid

Americans grossly overestimate how much development aid the US provides to poor countries in comparison to that provided by countries of the EU. The average respondent believed that of all the development aid from the US and EU taken together, the US is providing 60% (mean 59%) and the EU countries 40% (mean 41%). When asked what shares would be appropriate, the median response, again, was that the US should provide 50% (mean 40%) and the EU should provide 50% (mean 60%). In reality, though, the EU countries give 78%—and the US only 22%—of the total provided by the US and EU together.

When a different sample was asked to estimate what percentage the US gives "of all the aid given by wealthy countries to poor countries to help them develop their economies," the median responses were similar—that the US does give 60% (mean 58%), and that a 40% US share would be appropriate. In fact, according to recent OECD figures, the US gives just 12% of the total amount of official development assistance.

Perception of Share of Troops in Bosnia

Americans grossly overestimate the portion of the troops in Bosnia that are American. Asked to think about the troops from the US and EU countries in the NATO peacekeeping force in Bosnia, and to estimate what percentage of these were American, the median response was that the US was contributing 60% (mean 57%) of these troops and the EU countries were contributing 40% (mean 43%). When asked what the appropriate balance would be, the median response was for the US to contribute 40% (mean 37%), with the Europeans contributing 60% of the troops (mean 63%). In reality, at the time the poll was conducted the US had about 9,000 troops in Bosnia, while the EU countries combined had about 20,000 troops there. Thus their relative shares were 31% for the US and 69% for the EU. (Another 6,000 troops were present from other countries, and remain a significant portion of the overall force.)

These findings are consistent with other findings in the present study that deal with the NATO operation in Bosnia. When a different sample was asked, "What is your hunch about what percentage of the troops in the peacekeeping operation are American?" the mean response was 53%. (In fact, throughout 1997 the US percentage of the total operation was approximately 25%.) When asked about contributing US troops to the extended NATO mission in Bosnia with the following question, "If our European allies and some other countries would provide 75% of the troops for this extended mission, should the US be willing or should the US not be willing to contribute 25%?", an overwhelming 78% of respondents said the US should be willing, while only 18% said it should not.

Perceptions of Share of UN Dues

In the case of UN dues, Americans underestimate how much the EU countries are assessed relative to the US assessment. When respondents were asked to estimate, the median answer was that of all the UN dues assessed to the US and EU countries combined, the US share was 50% (mean 50%) and the EU share was 50% (mean 50%).

Asked what would be appropriate, the median preference was for the US share to be 40% (mean 37%) and the EU countries' share to be 60% (mean 63%). In reality, this is already the case; the amounts the average respondent found appropriate are the actual shares. The percentage of the total regular budget of the UN that the US is assessed is 25%, while the EU countries together are assessed 37%, making for a near-exact 40/60 ratio between the US and the EU.

Comparisons With European Attitudes

1. Among the publics in EU countries, most have a favorable view of the US and, despite the end of the Cold War, would like the US to stay engaged in Europe. Strong majorities support the continuation of NATO.

According to an April 1998 USIA poll, a very strong majority in the three countries polled had a favorable view of the US. This was especially true in Britain (76%) and Germany (81%). In France, support was not as high but was still a strong majority-59%.

Parallel to US views, large majorities say that their countries' ties with the US are at least as important as they were during the Cold War. Most say relations are as important as before the Cold War-Britain (68%), France (68%), and Germany (72%). In Britain and Germany, approximately one in ten also say that relations are even more important. While attitudes in Britain and France have largely stayed steady, in France there has been a warming trend, with the number saying that ties with the US have become less important in the wake of the Cold War dropping from 35% in 1993 to 20% today.

Continuing support for US ties despite the end of the Cold War may be partly explained by the fact that Europeans do not perceive the world as significantly safer. Presented the statement "Since the fall of the Berlin Wall the world has become much safer," a majority of Germans (59%) and French (57%) and a plurality of the British (42%) disagreed.

Europeans seem to have a fair amount of confidence in the US. According to a 1996 USIA poll, majorities-69% in Britain, 58% in France, 61% in Germany-express confidence in the US to "deal responsibly with world problems." This is comparable to their faith in their own countries (68% in Britain and France, 57% in Germany).

Europeans also express confidence that the US is concerned about European security. Asked "How much do you think the US cares about the security of Europe?", majorities in Britain (69%), France (58%), and Germany (62%) say "a great deal" or "a fair amount." Moreover, 78% in France, 75% in Britain, and 81% in Germany express confidence in the US to assist them militarily if their "country's security were threatened by some other country." These are comparable to their confidence in their European allies (80% in France, 68% in Britain, and 75% in Germany). Americans, however, are not as confident-only 55% express such confidence that the Europeans will assist the US.

The French, however-consistent with their generally lower confidence in the US role in Europe-are divided about whether the US and France are moving in a common direction in regard to European security. In an April 1998 USIA poll, French respondents were asked "whether over the last twelve months you think US and French policies have been working in the same direction or in different directions" in the area of "European security." Forty-two percent said they were working in the same direction but 44% said they were working in different directions.

Though France has sided with Russia on a number of issues of late, there are no indications, however, that France, or other European countries, are drifting away from the US and toward Russia. Asked whether over the last twelve months their country's policies and Russia's "have been working in the same direction or in different directions," on the Bosnian peace process or Iraqi weapons inspections, in all cases only small minorities (17-33%) said "same." These were similar to the 18-31% of Americans who answered "same" in response to the question.

Support for Maintaining NATO

For the most part there is widespread support for maintaining NATO on both sides of the Atlantic. According to USIA's 1998 survey very large majorities support their countries membership in NATO. This was true of 75% of the British, 64% of the French and 68% of the Germans. Fifty-eight percent of the Spanish also felt this way (USIA 1997).

Slightly fewer said that the NATO is "still essential to our country's security"- 67% of British respondents, 50% of French respondents, and 60% of German respondents. Respectively 15%, 37%, and 23% say "it is no longer essential." In 1996 USIA found that 60% of Italians, 40% of the Spanish, and 52% of the Turkish found NATO essential. Overall these numbers are similar to the 65% of Americans who say NATO is still essential (21% no longer essential).

Though a significant number of Europeans say that NATO is no longer essential, very few, nonetheless, wish to disband it. In 1997 USIA asked respondents who said that NATO is no longer essential whether they felt that NATO should be disbanded. Very few felt that it should- 9% of the British, 18% of the French, 13% of the Germans, 17% of the Italians, 24% of the Spanish, 13% of the Turkish.

Comparing 1996 and 1998 data there appears to be some growth in uncertainty about whether NATO is still essential. In all three European countries asked-Britain, France and Germany-as well as the US there has been a significant increase in the percentage who would not take a position one way or the other on this question. In Germany this number grew from 2% to 17%, Britain from 5% to 19%, France 7% to 13%, and in the US from 6% to 19%. This does not signal a clear erosion of support for NATO, though, as there has been more migration away from the position that NATO is no longer essential than from the position that it is essential.

2. Overall, Europeans would like the EU to have a more balanced relationship with the US. Overwhelming majorities would like the EU to play a strong leadership role in the

world. Most Europeans feel that the US has too much influence in Europe and many feel that the US does not treat Europe as an equal partner. However, Europeans now give a mixed response when asked whether they would be willing to spend more on defense in exchange for having greater influence over European security decisions.

Europeans are overwhelmingly enthusiastic about the EU playing a strong leadership role in world affairs. In the April 1998 USIA poll very strong majorities in Britain (76%), France (83%) and Germany (72%) support the EU playing such a role. Americans are no less enthusiastic.

Most Europeans also support the idea of the US playing a strong leadership role, and there seems to be a trend in the direction of greater support over the last year. As always the British are the most positive. The German have recently moved from plurality support to solid majority support, while the Italians show modest majority support. The French have inched upward from plurality support to modest majority support, while the Spanish and the Turkish are the most opposed to the US exerting a strong leadership role.

At the same time, the poll found substantial majorities of Europeans saying that the US has too much influence. Majorities in France (74%), Britain (67%), and Germany (54%) said that "the US has too much influence over our country's affairs." In a similar SOFRES question (October 1996), 64% of French respondents said that "the influence of the United States in the world is excessive."

Many Europeans also feel that the US does not treat them as an equal partner in affairs that concern them both. A strong majority in France (68%) feel this way, as do 50% of the British (27% and 39%, respectively, think the US does treat them as equals). However, 57% of Germans feel that the US does treat them as an equal partner (not as equal: 27%).

There also seems to be some resentment about how the US pushed for the decision to enlarge NATO. A Fall 1997 USIA survey asked respondents in Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Turkey whether "the decision was reached fairly in the best interests of all NATO members" or if "the US unfairly imposed its own preferences on other countries." Large numbers said they had not heard enough to say, but in every country (even Britain), among those who answered, most said that the US had imposed its preferences and-in every case except Germany-by very wide margins. In Italy and Turkey, overall majorities took this position.

Perhaps in part as a reaction to this perception of the US as overbearing, most Europeans feel that the EU, rather than NATO, should "make the most important decisions about the security of Europe in the future." In the April 1998 USIA poll, 61% of the French felt this way (27% preferred NATO) as well as 49% of Germans (32% preferred NATO). In fall 1997 59% of Italians expressed this view (19% preferring NATO) as did 51% of the Spanish (16% NATO). Of the countries polled only the British favored NATO (40% in 1998) over the EU (33%).

When Europeans are asked whether they would be willing to spend more on defense as part of a larger 'grand bargain' by which they would have more influence on security issues, this now elicits a mixed response, down from broad majorities just two years ago, but is still at least a plurality position.

In four of the six countries polled. When USIA asked such a question in 1996, a majority of the French (57%), Spanish (70%), Italians (60%) and Germans (52%) embraced the idea. Only the British favored keeping the present relationship (52%). However, in 1997 Spanish support dropped to a plurality of 48% (though only 24% endorsed the alternative of keeping the present relationship). German support dropped to a plurality in 1997 (42%) and then to a minority in 1998 (31%). Only the French and Italians have

held steady, with majorities favoring the bargain. Only one finding is available for Turkey, showing plurality support (47%) in favor of the bargain with 37% favoring the existing relationship. As discussed above, a strong majority of Americans support such an arrangement (67%).

3. A strong majority of Europeans feel Europe carries its fair share in international efforts. While an overwhelming majority of Americans feel that the US carries more than its fair share in international efforts, a strong majority of Europeans rejects this view. In response to the question about whether they are "each doing their fair share in maintaining peace in Europe," a plurality feels that Europeans are carrying their fair share-with an additional minority saying that Europe is doing more.

However a substantial minority of Europeans does feel that the US carries more than its fair share-a larger percentage than believes that Europe is doing more. Similarly, pluralities in Britain (43%), France (42%) and Germany (43%) believe that the US, in relation to Europe, is doing its fair share in NATO's Bosnia mission. About as many (16% in Britain, 20% in France, 20% in Germany) believe that Europe is doing more than its fair share as believe it is doing less (19% in Britain, 22% in France, 15% in Germany).

Chapter 2: European Unification

Since the end of the Second World War, the countries of western Europe have pursued the gradual integration of their economies, political systems, and even societies. Beginning with the creation of the European Steel and Coal Community in 1951 and the European Economic Community in 1957, their national economies have moved toward unification; a process that will culminate with the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999.

But European integration is not simply about economic prosperity, it is also aimed at creating a region of peace on the European continent. Thus the drive toward economic unification has been accompanied by moves toward political integration, including efforts to build more joint European foreign and defense policies. As the European Union has become more integrated, it also has widened, expanding from the original six members of the European Community to the current fifteen, with several Central European countries expected to join in the next ten years.

The United States has been a major supporter of the move toward European unification. It provided an initial incentive through the 1947 Marshall Plan, and since then, a wide range of US administrations has voiced their support for further integration in Europe. Most recently, the US government has encouraged the European Union to speed the admission of some Central European countries as a means of bolstering regional stability.

But US support for European unification does have an element of ambiguity. Were Europe to become fully unified so that it acts as a singular player in world affairs, it could certainly challenge America's dominant position, both within the transatlantic alliance and around the world. Europe does have a larger economy and population than the US, and the EMU, if successful, could challenge the dollar's preeminent position on international currency markets. Moreover, US administrators occasionally have criticized Europe for assuming an independent role on issues such as the Middle East, trade with Asia, and relations with certain "rogue" states, such as Cuba and Iran. European governments have retorted that as the economic and political power of the EU grows, Washington cannot expect Europe always to simply follow its lead.

But it is not just the policymakers whose views of European integration are important: the attitudes of the American and European publics also will affect the evolution of transatlantic relations. Does the US public see European integration as a reality or a distant goal? Does it view the emerging EU as a partner

or a competitor on the world scene? As for the Europeans, with many years of experience in European unification efforts behind them, do they still see economic and political integration as a good thing? Do they view Europe as now ready to take on the role of a global partner?


1. The majority of Americans has a positive attitude toward European Unification. Only a minority fears that greater unification may make Europe a competitor of the US, while an overwhelming majority is hopeful that it will cause Europe to share more of the burden of keeping peace in Europe and the world. Americans, however, are divided about the Europe having a joint military force.

Respondents were told, "As you may know, western European countries have organized themselves into something called the European Union. As a result, they have removed all internal trade barriers between themselves and try to coordinate their economies and foreign policies." A majority of 58% said that they see this as a "mostly positive" development, while 27% saw it as "mostly negative" (don't know: 14%).

A different sample was asked specifically about whether Europe's economic unification would be good or bad for the US, using a question first asked in a poll by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) in 1994. It went: "In 1992, most of the countries of western Europe became one economic market, with no internal trade restrictions. Do you think the economic unification of Western Europe is mostly a good thing or mostly a bad thing for the United States?" In the present poll 60% called economic unification "mostly a good thing" for the US, while 27% said it was "mostly a bad thing" (don't know: 12%).

In October 1994 CCFR found just 49% seeing economic unification as positive and 22% as negative. The ratio of those who see it as positive or negative is largely unchanged. What has changed is a reduction of those who responded "don't know" from 29% to 12%, presumably in response to more information about the issue.

European Economic Unification Viewed As:



Nonetheless, awareness of the process of European unification is low among Americans. Asked how much they had heard about it, 34% said they had heard "a great deal" (11%) or "some" (24%), while 65% said they had heard "not very much" (39%) or "nothing at all" (26%) about it.

Support for European unification is markedly higher among those who have more information. Among those who said they had heard a great deal or some, 69% said they regarded this development as "mostly positive" while 22% regarded it as "mostly negative." On the other hand, among those who said they had heard "not very much" or "nothing at all" about it, 34% saw it as positive, 34% saw it as negative, and 32% said they didn't know.

The prospect of further European integration to the point that the European Union would become a true federal state still elicits more approval than disapproval, but support is not as strong as for the developments that have occurred to date. When asked, "If the European countries do act together more, almost like a single country, do you think this would be mostly good or mostly bad for the US?", 47% thought this would be "mostly good" (lower than the 58% approving the unification that has already occurred). Forty-one percent thought this would be "mostly bad" (up from 27% with a currently negative view).

In order to learn what attitudes might underlie how Americans would view further integration, different samples were asked to evaluate arguments in support and in opposition to further European integration. As shown in the box entitled "Hopes Outweigh Fears About Unification," a majority of 55% rejected the argument that a more unified European Union would be a greater competitor to the US, while an overwhelming 82% agreed that a more unified Europe could share more of the burden of maintaining peace. This is consistent with other findings discussed above, showing strong majorities in favor of a "grand bargain" with Europe that would include redistributing the security burden.

<i>Hopes Outweigh Fears About Unification</i>	
	41%
<i>"If the countries of the European Union do act together more, almost like a single country, they may become more of a competitor with the US, so this would be bad."</i>	55%
	<i>disagree</i>
	82%
<i>"If the countries of the European Union do act together more, almost like a single country, they may be able to share more of the burden in keeping the peace in Europe and the world, so this would be good"</i>	15%
	<i>disagree</i>

Low Support for European Joint Force

Over many years, there have been extensive discussions and some trial efforts toward eventually developing a European joint military force, possibly under the aegis of the Western European Union. PIPA tried to sound out how Americans would react to such a force by asking the following question:

Currently western European countries are considering the possibility of having a joint military force to deal with problems that may arise in Europe. Some say that this would be a good idea because it would give the Europeans an ability to deal with problems in Europe without having to involve the US. Others say it is not a good idea because this all-European military force might do things that are not in the best interests of the US. Do you think this is a good idea, or not a good idea, for the European countries to have a joint military force?

The response was divided, with a 50% plurality saying that a joint military force was a good idea, while 45% said it was a bad idea. A different sample heard the same question, with one difference: they heard that such a force "could go to other parts of the world, such as Africa, to deal with problems that may arise there." In this case support was a bit lower, with just 44% saying it is a good idea and a bare majority of 51% saying it is a bad idea.


The lack of support for a European military force indicates that although Americans would like Europe to carry more of the security burden, that does not mean they wish to disengage from Europe. Despite Americans' strong feelings that Europeans do not carry their fair share, they are uncomfortable with the notion (posed in the question) of European problems being dealt with "without having to involve the US." Being able to carry less of the burden is different from not being involved.

These questions also highlight that while Americans show a willingness to share decision-making power with Europeans, they are not eager for Europe to act separately. The prospect of a European military force that could operate autonomously and that "might do things that are not in the best interest of the US" is quite different from the prospect of sharing power in a partnership. And, apparently, this discomfort is evoked a little more strongly when the potential arena for such European action is the world in general, not just Europe.

2. Overall, Americans show little concern about the the European Monetary Union and the emergence of the euro.

Respondents were told, "western Europe is preparing to unify its economy further by having a single currency, called the Euro, that will be introduced next year." Only a small minority (18%) said that the introduction of the Euro would be "mostly a bad thing for the US." A 45% plurality thought the Euro would make no difference to the US, while 24% thought it would be mostly a good thing for the US (don't know: 14%).

Awareness of monetary union is quite low. Asked how much they had heard about it, only 32% had heard "a great deal" (10%) or "some" (22%), while 68% had heard "not very much" (25%) or "nothing at all" (43%).



Among those who were more aware of the advent of the Euro, the percentage saying that it would make no difference for the US was 34%--down from 45% for the whole sample. The balance between positive and negative views, though, was largely the same, with 36% seeing it as mostly good and 25% as mostly bad.

3. Most Americans feel that the European Union has made significant steps toward acting like a single country but do not expect this process to gain great momentum in the future.

PIPA asked respondents to evaluate the current level of European unity as follows:

I would like to know whether it is your impression that the countries of the European Union now act more like separate countries with different agendas or whether they act more like a single country. Please answer on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being that they act completely like separate countries and 10 being that they act completely like a single country.

The median response was 5 (mean 4.92). The same respondents were then asked: "Using the same scale, how do you think the countries of the European Union will act 10 years from now?" The median response was 6 (mean 5.76). In other words, Americans tend to view the countries of the European Union as being "in between" acting like separate countries and acting like one country. They expect the European Union's countries to act more like a single country in ten years than they see them as doing today, but they do not expect this shift will be dramatic.

Comparison to the European Public

1. Europeans have a less positive attitude about European unification than do Americans. While a solid majority of Americans supports the political and economic unification of Europe, the British fail to muster majority support, and even among the French and Germans the majorities are fairly

modest. However, more solid majorities of Europeans support a common foreign and defense policy and European joint military force, while Americans are divided on the latter prospect.

In the 1998 USIA survey, respondents were asked: "Do you think the political unification of western Europe is mostly a good thing or mostly a bad thing for [survey country]?" Overall, the British were decidedly unenthusiastic (34% support). The French showed a modest majority in favor (54%), with only the Germans showing substantial majority support (59%). As discussed above, in response to a question that gave a brief description of the current process of European unification, 58% of Americans in the USIA poll viewed it as mostly a good thing for the US.

Support for Political Unification of Europe

Asked whether political unification of Europe is mostly a good thing or mostly a bad thing for their country.

	Germany	Britain	France	US
Mostly good	59%	34%	54%	58%
Mostly bad	24%	41%	33%	27%

Support for economic unification was similar. Asked what they think about the "economic unification of western Europe," the British were a bit higher in support at 39%, the French weighed in about the same at 55%, while the Germans were significantly lower at just 50%. A PIPA question that described the economic unification of western Europe found 60% of Americans saying that it is "mostly a good thing for the United States," while 27% said it was "mostly a bad thing."

Support for Economic Unification of Europe

Asked whether economic unification of Europe is mostly a good thing or mostly a bad thing for their country.

	Germany	Britain	France	US
Mostly good	50%	39%	55%	60%
Mostly bad	29%	37%	33%	27%

According to a November 1997 Eurobarometer poll, 49% of respondents from the EU as a whole said EU membership was a "good thing" for their country. The level of support varied widely from country to country, with the greatest support in Ireland (83%), the Netherlands (76%) and Luxembourg (71%). By contrast, it received far weaker support from the public in Sweden (31%), Austria (31%), and Britain (36%).

Somewhat higher levels of support were reported in a May 1997 European Commission (EC) Continuous Tracking Survey poll--overall, 58% of Europeans felt that "membership of the European Union is a good thing." Again, the highest levels of support came from Ireland (78%) and the Netherlands (77%). The only countries that did not show majority support were Britain (39%), Denmark (48%), Finland (42%), Austria, (38%) and Sweden (25%).

A USIA poll in the fall of 1997 found majority support for EU membership among the French (73%), the Germans (58%), the Italians (86%) and the Spanish (80%), but only plurality support in Britain (49%).

Interestingly, support for specific steps toward greater unification was sometimes higher than for actual membership. According to the May 1997 EC Continuous Tracking Survey, a very strong majority of all Europeans (72%) agreed that "the European member countries should have one common foreign policy towards non-member states." Support was particularly strong in Greece (88%) and Belgium (85%). Finland (48%) was the only country where support was below 50%. A USIA survey in the fall of 1997, however, found that only 41% of the British favored it, while 30% were opposed, and 29% did not answer.

The May 1997 EC Continuous Tracking Survey also found that more than eight in ten Europeans also believed that "the member countries should have a common defense policy." The highest levels of support were found in Greece (92%), France (91%) and Belgium (90%). Only in Scandinavia was a sizable minority opposed (Finland 41%, Sweden 36%, Denmark 33%).

Consistent with support for a common defense policy, support for a European joint military force was quite high among the four countries polled. In the April 1998 USIA poll, the idea of a "common defense force" was favored by 68% of the Germans (opposed 21%), 70% of the French (opposed 21%) and 53% of the British (opposed 25%). In the fall of 1997, USIA also found 77% support in Italy. As discussed above, this is the form of European unification of which Americans are the least supportive, with the public divided on whether they favor it.

It should be noted that this European support for a common defense force does not signify a wish to pull away from NATO. At least two-thirds of those in favor of this force believe that it should act in conjunction with NATO, rather than act separately or replace NATO. However, there are signs that some Europeans want the EU to play a stronger role relative to NATO. When asked to choose whether NATO or the EU should make the "most important decisions about the security of Europe in the future," a majority of the French (61%) and a plurality of the Germans (49%) supported the EU, while a plurality of the British (40%) favored NATO.

2. Europeans are divided on the question of the European Monetary Union and a common European currency.

In 1996 as well as in 1998, USIA asked Europeans about whether they favor "a common European currency." Overall, support was mixed, though a bit higher in the 1998 poll. The French and Italians show majority approval, while a majority of the British were opposed. The Germans have moved from strong majority opposition to plurality opposition.

Mixed Support for Common European Currency

		Germany	Britain	France	Italy
Favor	<i>1996</i>	34%	27%	51%	75%
	<i>1998</i>	44%	31%	59%	n/a
Oppose	<i>1996</i>	62%	61%	42%	18%
	<i>1998</i>	49%	57%	37%	n/a

When the issue was presented by USIA in April 1997 in the larger context of a description of the European Monetary Union, with mention of the need for spending cuts to meet entry requirements, support was significantly lower. Only the Italians showed plurality support, while the majority of Germans and British, and even a plurality of the French, were opposed.

Low Support for EMU				
Question: "Some people support the European Monetary Union because it will make goods from other EU countries more available and less expensive Others oppose the EMU because government spending will have to be cut in order to meet entry requirements. Which view is closer to yours?"				
	Germany	Britain	France	Italy
Favor	36%	28%	40%	45%
Oppose	56%	55%	43%	38%
Don't know/refused	8%	18%	17%	17%

When USIA in April 1997 presented the issue in the larger context of a description of the European Monetary Union, with mention of the need for spending cuts to meet entry requirements, support was significantly lower. Only the Italians showed plurality support, while the majority of Germans and British, and even a plurality of the French, were opposed.

3. Presently, Europeans tend to see the EU as less integrated than do Americans-i.e., as acting much more like separate countries than like a single country. However, European expectations are that ten years from now the EU will be significantly more unified-in line with American expectations.

USIA asked respondents, "Do you think that the European Union acts more like a single country, or acts more like separate countries with different agendas?" Overall, Europeans saw the EU countries as still acting quite separately. In Britain, only 16% said the EU acts more like a single country, while 56% said it acts more like separate countries. In France, the balance was 16% to 70%, while in Germany it was 17% to 49%.

Europeans were much less prone than Americans to view the EU as acting in a unified fashion. PIPA asked a nearly identical question but had respondents answer on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being acting completely like separate countries and 10 acting completely like a single country. As mentioned, the average response was 4.92. Taking the USIA data and adapting it to the US scale, the average response for Britain was 2.6, for France 2.2 and for Germany 3.2.

USIA also asked respondents how the EU will act "in ten years." In this case, Europeans showed much more optimism that it would be acting in a unified fashion. In Britain, 36% thought that the EU would be acting more like a single country, while 33% said it would be acting more like separate countries. For France, the balance was 46% to 35%, and for Germany, 37% to 26%.


These predictions were quite similar to the US position. As mentioned, the mean response to a nearly identical question, on a scale of 0 to 10, was 5.8. Adapting the USIA data to this scale, the mean response was for Britain 5.2, for France 5.6, and for Germany 5.7. This suggests that Europeans are closer to, and more aware of, the flaws in cooperation among the EU members today, but that their expectations of change are stronger than are those of Americans.

Chapter 3: NATO Enlargement and the Future of NATO

1. A substantial majority supports expanding NATO to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Awareness of the issue is low, though rising. Responses to popular pro and con arguments suggest that support is consolidating.

When asked whether they are "inclined to favor or oppose expanding NATO to include some Eastern European countries such as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic," 61% said they favored doing so (23% strongly). Twenty-six percent were opposed (13% strongly) and 13% didn't give an opinion. Among Republicans, 61% were in favor, 54% of Democrats were in favor, while 72% of independents were in favor.


This is approximately the same level of support that PIPA found in September 1996 using the same question (62% favor, 29% opposed). It is also approximately the same as the 63% approval that Pew Research Center found in September 1997 in response to a nearly identical question (18% disapproval). A June 1997 NBC Wall Street Journal poll found only 52% approval of NATO enlargement. However this was in response to a long question that did not mention the countries by name and did raise concerns about financial costs and the potential for antagonizing Russia. Other polls that did not mention the countries by name have also found lower support.



Should the Senate Ratify?

A slightly different question, asked to a different sample, was whether the Senate should ratify the commitment to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The question clarified that NATO countries, including the US, have already agreed to include these countries. In this case, 61% thought the Senate should ratify while 21% favored rejecting the new obligation.

Another sample was asked the same question but was also given the information that "This idea has received support from both Republican and Democratic leaders in Congress as well as the President. However, some members of Congress in both parties are opposed." In this case, 69% said the Senate should ratify.



Admitting Specific Countries

In a PIPA question that asked about admitting specific countries to NATO, and in which respondents were asked to "keep...in mind that the US, together with other NATO members, must defend any NATO country that comes under attack," eight out of ten countries received majority support. Going from most to least, support for including Poland was 72%, Hungary 70%, Czech Republic 63%, Romania 61%, Ukraine 57%, the Baltic States 54%, Bulgaria 55%, Slovakia 51%, Russia 51% and Slovenia 47%.

In August 1997 CNN/USA Today asked a similarly worded question about including specific countries that also mentioned the commitment to defend members from attack. In this case support was a bit lower than the more recent PIPA poll but still fairly high: 65% supported including Poland, 58% Hungary, but only 51% the Czech Republic.

Support for Including Specific Countries in NATO

Poland	72%
Hungary	70%
Czech Republic	63%
Romania	61%
Ukraine	57%
Bulgaria	55%
Baltic States	54%
Russia	51%
Slovakia	51%
Slovenia	47%

Response to Pro and Con Arguments

There are signs that support for NATO enlargement may be consolidating. In the September 1996 PIPA poll 10 arguments in favor and 10 arguments in opposition to NATO enlargement were presented. Four of each of these 10 were presented in the current poll. As in September 1996, the pro arguments were rated as more convincing than the con arguments. However, in the current poll all pro arguments were stronger than before, with the majority finding three out of four arguments convincing. All con arguments, on the other hand, slipped substantially with only one out of four receiving even slight majority support. This suggests that a public debate is more likely to increase rather than to weaken support for enlargement.

Low Awareness

Awareness of the issue of NATO enlargement is low, but it does appear to be rising. Asked how much they have heard about the issue only 8% said "a great deal," but this is up from 7% in September 1996. Twenty-six percent said they have heard some (up from 22%), 34% said "not very much" (up from 33%) and 32% said "nothing at all" (down from 38%). (Support for NATO expansion was significantly higher for those who had greater awareness of the issue than for those who did not.)

An overwhelming majority is also poorly informed on the issue. Pew found in September 1997 that only 10% could name any of the countries that are to be new members.

2. Most Americans say they would be willing to contribute US troops to an effort to defend a new NATO member from attack. Most Americans do not, however, want to make an unequivocal commitment to use nuclear weapons to defend new members.

Naturally, a key question is whether Americans would really be willing to send US troops to defend a new NATO member from attack. To explore this question, respondents were presented a scenario in which Poland has become a member of NATO and comes under attack from Russia, and were asked

whether they would or would not be ready "to support sending US and other NATO troops to defend Poland." A strikingly high number of 69% said that they would with 23% saying that they would not. This is close to 68% that said they would in September 1996 (25% would not).

PIPA's September 1996 poll made further probes to find out how solid this commitment was by presenting the same question as above, but offering a third option which said "I don't know if I would be ready to support sending US and other NATO troops to defend Poland. But I favor making preparations to defend Poland because this will discourage Russians from even thinking about being aggressive." In this case, a plurality of 45% opted for this position while 37% simply said they "would be ready." Only 13% said they "would not be ready" to send troops.


The prospect of risking lives of American troops is troubling to many Americans, but for most it is not a strong enough reason to not enlarge NATO. When presented the argument against NATO enlargement that "this might mean we will have to risk the lives of American soldiers," just 44% found this argument convincing (52% found it unconvincing). This was down from September 1996 when 49% found it convincing.

Apparently this support for committing US troops to defend Eastern European countries is greatly affected by the question being premised on these countries being part of NATO. Other polls have not found such support when NATO membership is not mentioned. An October 1994 poll by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations simply asked about using US troops if Russia invaded Poland: only 32% were in favor with 50% opposed.

The Nuclear Commitment

Apparently most Americans do not want to make an unequivocal commitment to use nuclear weapons to defend new member states from attack. Given three options, only 13% said "the US should commit to defend new members from attack even if it becomes necessary to use nuclear weapons." Thirty-five percent said "The US should not commit to use nuclear weapons." The plurality, 49%, chose the more equivocal option that said "The US should be somewhat ambiguous about either committing to use or to not use nuclear weapons" and should "keep its options open."

Should US Commit to Defend New Members with Nuclear Weapons?



3. Support for NATO enlargement is derived more from principles of inclusiveness and collective security than from a desire to strengthen the military alliance against possible Russian resurgence.

Asked to choose between two arguments in favor of NATO expansion only 29% chose the one that said: "NATO should be expanded to make NATO larger and more powerful so that it can more effectively deal with the possibility of a threat from Russia in the future." Sixty-three percent chose, instead, the argument that "NATO should be expanded to remove the outdated divisions of the Cold War and help bring Europe together."


In the September 1996 PIPA poll, among ten arguments presented in favor of NATO expansion the most popular argument--rated as convincing by 77%-- was that "It is better to include Eastern European countries rather than to exclude them because peace is more likely if we all communicate and work together." In the current poll this argument was again the most popular (of four offered) with 80% finding it convincing.

The second most popular argument in September 1996 and in the current poll was based explicitly on the principle of collective security. It read: "NATO should commit to defending eastern European countries because it is important for potential aggressors to know that they cannot get away with conquering other countries". Seventy-five percent found it convincing in the current poll (69% in September 1996).

The most popular argument against NATO enlargement was also based on the theme of inclusiveness. Fifty-three percent found convincing the argument that "Instead of expanding NATO, something new should be developed that includes Russia rather than treating Russia as an enemy." This is down from 62% in the September 1996 poll, perhaps because in the interim there have been steps taken to include Russia by establishing the Russia-NATO Council.

Arguments in favor of NATO expansion that stressed the Russian threat and the geopolitical competition with Russia were the most unpopular. The least popular argument was that "Russia is very weak these

days and this creates an opportunity for NATO to expand into Eastern Europe and consolidate our victory in the Cold War." Only 35% found this argument convincing with 59% finding it unconvincing. The same numbers as September 1996.




4. Consistent with the low emphasis on strengthening NATO as a military alliance, the majority opposes spending money to upgrade the militaries of new member states.

Respondents were presented the following question:

Currently there is a controversy about how important it is to spend money toward making the militaries of the new NATO members as effective as the current members. Some people say this is important because it will make sure that these new countries can better do their part in the event of a military conflict. Others say that this would be too expensive, given that NATO is already strong and faces no real threat. Assuming that the US would be paying 25% of the costs, do you think NATO should or should not spend money toward making the militaries of new NATO members as effective as the current members?

By almost a two-to-one margin, those opposed (60%) outnumbered those who favored (33%) spending such money. Apparently the willingness to include new members into NATO is derived more from the principles of inclusiveness and collective security than from the idea that there are significant threats requiring a further development of the military aspects of NATO.




5. Consistent with their orientation to collective security, most Americans support the new Russia-NATO Council and even support eventually including Russia in NATO. Wariness of Russia as a potential future threat has increased over the last year and a half, but this has not diminished support for being inclusive toward Russia.

Respondents were presented the following question:

Recently NATO set up a joint council with Russia to have regular discussions of security issues. There is some controversy about whether this is a good idea or a bad idea. Some say that giving Russia a new avenue to press its position gives Russia too much influence and risks weakening NATO. Others say that including Russia in such discussions promotes communication and can help resolve potential conflicts. On balance, do you think that having such a NATO-Russia council is a good idea or a bad idea?

An overwhelming 67% said they thought it is a good idea, with just 26% saying it is a bad idea.




Consistent with their move away from viewing NATO as a military alliance and toward viewing it like a collective security system, Americans are even friendly to the idea of including Russia in NATO. As mentioned, when Russia was presented on a list together with other countries 57% favored including Russia with 41% opposed. This is almost exactly the same as in September 1996.

When a longer time horizon was offered, a strong majority expressed support for including Russia. Given two statements, only 30% embraced the position that "There are too many ways that our interests might come into conflict with Russia in the future and there is always the chance that Russia may go back to being aggressive. Therefore it is not a good idea to include Russia in NATO." Sixty-four percent chose the one that said "Once Russia has shown that it can be stable and peaceful for a significant period we should try to include it in NATO. This will help assure that Russia will stay stable and peaceful."

When asked to rate the likelihood that Russia will become a threat sometime in the future on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 with being highly unlikely and 10 highly likely, the mean response is 5.51. This is up from 4.89 in September 1996. This increase is most likely due to friction between the US and Russia over Iraq, which was prominent at the time the poll was taken. Interestingly, this has not changed the majority's view that the best way to deal with this potential threat is to be inclusive toward Russia.

6. A plurality favors further enlarging NATO beyond the inclusion of the first three new members.

A major controversy within NATO is whether it should expand to include more members than Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Some members of Congress have called for a five-year moratorium on adding new members beyond the first three. However, a plurality (50%) supported the idea that "NATO should enlarge beyond Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic and accept other candidates in the next five years." Forty-three percent were opposed. This finding may actually underrepresent the potential support however, because as discussed above, when specific countries are named nearly all receive majority support, with Romania receiving 61% approval, Ukraine 57%, and Bulgaria 55%.



7. In general the majority feels that Western nations have an obligation to integrate Eastern European countries, but do not feel that the US should pressure the European Union to speed up their acceptance of new members into the EU.

Another controversy within NATO is that the US has put some pressure on the European Union to include Eastern European countries in the EU, before considering them for inclusion in NATO. A modest majority (55%) of Americans does feel that "Western nations have a moral obligation to integrate central and east European countries into organizations like NATO and the European Union."

However, most Americans do not think the US should put pressure on the EU to speed up inclusion of new members. Asked to choose between two statements, 40% chose the one that said "We should put pressure on the European Union to expand because this will help stabilize the Eastern European countries and better ensure peace in Europe." Fifty-three percent chose the alternative that said, "We should not pressure the European Union to include these countries: it is the Europeans business when they think it is best to do so."

Comparisons to European Public

1. A majority or plurality in all European countries polled support enlarging NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Awareness of the issue is generally low, overall even lower than in the US.

In Britain, France and Germany in April 1998, and Italy, Spain and Turkey in Fall 1997, USIA asked the question:

As you may know, NATO has invited three countries, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, to join NATO. Keeping in mind that NATO, including our country, is required to assist the defense of any NATO member that comes under attack, do you ... support ... or ... oppose the admission of these three countries into NATO?

A majority said they were supportive in Britain (57%), France (56%), Italy (63%), Spain (58%) and Turkey (53%). A plurality in Germany (46%) took this position. PIPA asked a shorter question: “Are you inclined to favor or oppose expanding NATO to include some eastern European countries, such as Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic?” Sixty-one percent said they were in favor.

In 1996 USIA also asked about accepting a series of specific countries. PIPA asked the same question in the US in 1998, as well as in 1996. In Britain, France and Germany—as well in the US—substantial majorities favored including Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic; but there was substantial variation on other countries. A majority of the British also favored admitting the Baltics, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine. A majority of the French favored the Baltics, Bulgaria, and Slovakia; the Germans just Slovakia. For the US, however, a majority favored admitting all except Slovenia.

Low Awareness

Despite the fact that NATO enlargement involves countries that are much closer to them, Europeans’ awareness of the issue is generally even lower than in the US. Asked by USIA in Fall 1997, “How much have you heard about the issue of NATO enlargement?”, the percentage saying “a great deal” or “a fair amount” was: Britain 18%, France 30%, Germany 40%, Italy 26%, Spain 19%, Turkey 31%. In the US the percentage saying “a great deal” or “some” was 34%. The American percentage is actually higher than the average of the six European countries—27%.

2. Like Americans, Europeans have generally felt little sense of urgency for NATO expansion and have shown a willingness to accommodate Russian concerns.

In 1996, USIA asked Britons, French and Germans whether they felt a sense of urgency in expanding NATO or if they were willing to move more slowly to allay Russian anxieties. Germans and the French, like Americans, were ready to accommodate the Russians. The British were divided.

3. Like Americans, Europeans are reluctant to spend money on NATO enlargement.

In the fall 1997 USIA poll, respondents were asked, “Would you favor or oppose increasing the amount of money that your country gives to NATO to assist in the cost of enlargement?” In five countries, the majority was opposed—Britain 59%, France 65%, Germany 77%, Italy 54%, Spain 52%—while in Turkey a plurality (49%) were opposed. The highest level of support was 38% in Italy.

Similarly, when Americans were asked whether they supported spending money to upgrade the militaries of the new members, 60% were opposed with only 33% in favor. Presumably Europeans as well as Americans do not see clear threats that require increases in defense spending, though they support extending security guarantees to new members.

4. Majorities in Europe, as well as the US, would be willing to include Russia in NATO at a future date when it meets the conditions for membership, though Europeans are more cool than are Americans toward Russian membership in the immediate future. Europeans and Americans agree that Russia is not inherently aggressive.

As of 1996, Americans and Europeans seemed to agree that Russia should be included in Russia at some point in the future. USIA surveys in Britain, France, and Germany in 1995 and a poll conducted in the US by the Fletcher School in 1996 asked:

Do you think Russia should have the option to join NATO when it meets all the qualifications for membership, or do you think that Russia should be excluded from full membership in NATO?

In all four cases, a solid majority favored including Russia. Similarly, the PIPA poll in 1996 found 65% support for including Russia in NATO once it has demonstrated that it is a stable democracy.

However, when the prospect of including Russia was placed in a more immediate time horizon, support was somewhat lower, especially in Europe. When respondents were asked about including Russia in NATO in the context of a list of other European countries (and respondents were reminded that this would mean defending the new member from attack), 51% of Americans in 1998 favored including Russia (41% opposed). For Europeans in 1996, among the British support was 47% (33% opposed) and among the French support was 46% (45% opposed). In Germany a majority of 57% was opposed, with just 39% in favor.

Nonetheless, neither side of the Atlantic tends to believe that Russia is inherently aggressive, while strong majorities show optimism that, if democracy succeeds there, Russia will act peacefully. Overall, Europeans were more definite in rejecting the view of Russia as inherently aggressive than were Americans, with the exception of the Turkish, who were divided on the question. (See below.)

5. The prospect of further expanding NATO beyond Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in the next five years elicits low levels of support in Europe—lower than in the US.

USIA asked Europeans in fall 1997 and spring 1998 whether they favor enlarging NATO beyond Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in the next five years. Among current NATO members polled, a majority or a plurality favored it in Italy (54%), Spain (45%) and Turkey (52%). Only minorities favored it in Britain (34%), France (41%) and Germany (27%). In the US a plurality (50%) was in favor. US support (50%) was well above the average of the six European countries—42%.

6. Europeans are very strongly supportive of NATO expanding beyond its role as a military alliance and becoming a more inclusive and diverse security system. Americans are also supportive, though by a lesser margin.

In fall 1997, USIA presented a series of possible new missions for NATO that extended well beyond the traditional function of a military alliance and, in some cases, resembled more the function of a collective security system. These included using NATO troops to:

- Provide peacekeeping in the case of conflicts between NATO members
- Provide peacekeeping in countries bordering NATO members, such as Bosnia
- Strengthen security in a particular region, such as the Mediterranean
- Coordinate arms control efforts among NATO members
- Defend Western interests outside of Europe, such as in the Persian Gulf
- Combat international terrorism
- Combat international drug trafficking

Nearly all of these ideas were enthusiastically endorsed in Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Turkey. With just a few exceptions, support was 60% or more, often reaching into the 80% range.

The main exception was for using troops to “defend Western interests outside Europe, such as in the Persian Gulf.” Though this received strong support in Britain and Italy, only a modest majority supported it in Turkey (53%), a plurality supported it in France (49%) and Spain (46%), and a plurality opposed it in Germany (with just 32% in favor). The only other exceptions were that only a modest majority of Germans (51%) supported using troops “to strengthen security in a particular region, such as the Mediterranean” and just 56% of the Spanish supported doing so “to coordinate arms control efforts among NATO members.”

Americans are supportive of most missions but by a much lesser margin. The January 1997 Pew poll also explored the issue of expanding the functions of NATO, by asking whether “NATO forces, including US troops” should be used in a variety of new missions. Four of the five mentioned received modest majority support and one received support from a plurality. Fifty-six percent favored using NATO forces for “peacekeeping in case of conflicts between NATO member countries,” 54% for “peacekeeping in countries bordering NATO member countries, such as Bosnia,” 51% “to combat international drug trafficking,” 51% “to combat international terrorism,” and 49% “to defend Western interests outside Europe such as in the Persian Gulf.” Opposition to these ideas ranged from 34-39%, with 10-13% saying “don’t know.”

In the September 1996 PIPA poll, respondents were asked to rate a number of possible missions for NATO on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being not at all the right kind of thing for NATO to do and 10 being very much the right kind, all of the missions received a mean score above 5. They were:

- Dealing with threats to NATO countries such as the threat of terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction (mean score 7.39)
- Dealing with aggression and instability outside of Europe, such as the Gulf War” (mean score 6.10)
- Intervening in conflicts between NATO members (mean score 5.84)
- Doing peacekeeping to deal with border disputes and ethnic conflicts in the areas surrounding NATO (mean score 5.44)

7. Europeans have mixed views as to whether the Western nations have an obligation to integrate Eastern European countries.

When asked in fall 1997 USIA polls whether “Western nations have a moral obligation to integrate central and east European countries into organizations like NATO and the European Union,” Italians agreed most strongly—60%, with just 28% disagreeing. In Spain 53% agreed, while a large plurality of Britons (50%) also agreed. In Germany, however, respondents were divided, with only 41% agreeing and 36% disagreeing. When PIPA asked Americans the same question in the current study, 55% agreed; but in a different question, 53% felt the US should not pressure the European Union to expand to include some Eastern European countries.

Chapter 4: Bosnia

The Issues Dealing with the crisis in Bosnia has been one of the most difficult and most concrete challenges in the US-European relationship in the post Cold War era. When Yugoslavia collapsed in 1991, it was initially seen on both sides of the Atlantic as an opportunity for Europe to rise to a new level of leadership by taking the lead in dealing with this problem. When a UN peacekeeping force was established for Bosnia, the US declined to contribute troops, while the French and British provided the majority of the force and many other European countries contributed troops in significant numbers.


The lightly armed UN mission-highly dependent on cooperation from the warring parties-proved to be quite ineffective at dealing with the conflict. To European displeasure, the US continued to resist deeper involvement, while criticizing the Europeans' efforts as not forceful enough. The problem became an increasingly divisive one within NATO, to the point where it was widely perceived as a danger to the alliance itself.

In mid 1995, the US changed course and moved to a deeper level of involvement in Bosnia. Largely at US urging, NATO undertook a bombing campaign that, together with military gains by the Bosnian Muslims, led to the Dayton Accords which ended the war. NATO took over the peacekeeping operation designed to enforce the Dayton Accords. The US initially agreed to contribute one-third of the troops (later reduced to one quarter) and insisted on having an American in command. While the operation was originally seen as limited in duration, it was subsequently extended and then, recently, put on an open-ended basis.

Initially, and at each point the operation was extended, the US went through a tortured debate that centered largely on the question of whether the American public would support putting US troops in harm's way for an operation not clearly related to US vital interests. There were, and have continued to be, widespread concerns on both sides of the Atlantic that any US fatalities would lead to a loud public chorus calling for immediate withdrawal, potentially renewing a rift in the alliance.

Tensions between the US and Europe continue to exist. The US has pressed Europe to carry more of the burden of the operation. The Europeans, each time the US has considered withdrawing its troops, have stressed that if the US does withdraw they will follow suit. To understand the nature and degree of different publics' willingness to see the Bosnia mission continue-with their national troops participating-it is vital to gain some insight into how these publics perceive Bosnia today. Do they view the NATO mission as successful or unsuccessful? Do they feel that they are carrying more than their fair share in the operation? How are they likely to respond to troop fatalities? Throwing some light on these questions is crucial for grasping how durable public support might be and what the options would be for US-European cooperation in Bosnia.

1. Support for US participation in NATO's peace-keeping mission in Bosnia has increased significantly so that now a majority supports it. This appears to be due to a growing perception that the operation is succeeding. At the same time there is still widespread dissatisfaction with the operation's performance.



For the first time since US troops have been in Bosnia as part of the NATO peacekeeping operation, a solid majority is supportive. When asked whether they favor or oppose US troops "participating in the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia," 65% said they favored it, while 33% were opposed. A January 1998 CNN/USA Today poll also found a majority (53%) supportive when respondents were asked whether they "approve or disapprove of the presence of US troops in Bosnia." (The difference between the levels of support between these two poll findings can be largely attributed to the wording: Poll questions that specify that the US would be participating- implying that other countries are involved- and that it is a peacekeeping operation tend to receive as much as 10% more support than ones which may give the impression that the US would be acting unilaterally, as in the question that simply asks about approval for "the presence of US troops in Bosnia.")

This level of support is up dramatically from earlier polls. For example, in January 1996, shortly after the beginning of the operation, 48% said they approved of the "decision to send 20,000 US troops as part of an international peacekeeping force"(Pew) while just 36% said they approved of "the presence of US troops in Bosnia" (CNN/USA Today). It has only been in the last few months that these numbers have begun to move upward significantly. In November 1997, for the first time, polls found a plurality expressing approval for "the presence of US troops." The current PIPA poll is the only recent poll to ask about "participating in the peacekeeping operation."

In addition to asking neutral questions about US participation in the Bosnia operation, at the end of the questionnaire PIPA also asked respondents to rate a series of strongly worded arguments in favor of and in opposition to continued US participation. All of the pro arguments received strong majority support while no con arguments received majority support.

A pair of questions that addressed whether participation in the Bosnia operation is a good investment of US resources found strong support for the idea that it is. An overwhelming 74% agreed (23% disagreed) that:

If the war in Bosnia had continued, there was a chance that it might have spread to other countries in the region. While this chance may have been small, the consequences could have been very grave for Europe and for US interests. Therefore, contributing some US troops to the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia is good insurance.

Only 41% agreed with the counter-argument (56% disagreed) that:

Although there was some risk that the war in Bosnia might have spread to other countries in the region, it is impossible to know whether this really would have happened. We also cannot be sure the troops there are actually going to solve the problem. Therefore, having troops in Bosnia is not worth the risk and resources.

Another argument that is sometimes made is that the US should not be involved in Bosnia because it is a European problem, while the Europeans have said that they will only continue in the operation if the US continues to be part of it. Apparently most Americans do feel the US should play a role. Asked to choose between two arguments, only 35% chose the one that said "Bosnia is in Europe, therefore the Europeans should be ready to take responsibility for the problem themselves and not insist that the US be part of the operation too." A majority of 63% chose instead the argument that said, "The operation in Bosnia is a NATO operation and the US is part of NATO. Therefore, it is only fair that Europeans should expect that the US should also do its share."

Response to Pro and Con Arguments - Percent Finding Argument Convincing -	
<u>PRO</u>	<u>CON</u>
NATO countries, including the US, have agreed that it is important to enforce the agreement in Bosnia. As a NATO member, the US has a responsibility to do its share... 76%	Ethnic groups have been fighting in Bosnia for hundreds of years. It doesn't make sense for the US to continue to contribute troops to a NATO effort to try to solve a conflict that can't be solved. 45%
Before NATO went into Bosnia, many thousands of people died, many of them innocent children and bystanders. The presence of NATO has completely stopped this killing... 71%	Eventually the tensions in Bosnia will boil over. If we stay in the operation there, Americans are likely to be killed. Therefore we should get out now before Americans come back home in body bags. 44%
If NATO leaves Bosnia now, the war is likely to start up again. This would waste the progress that American troops have helped Bosnians to achieve, and would abandon those Bosnians who have put their hopes in democracy. 70%	Bosnia is far from the US and we have no real interests there. Therefore, it is wrong to risk the lives of American troops in a NATO peacekeeping operation in Bosnia. 35%
If we pull out now, it is likely that those who committed the atrocities 68%	Clearly the operation in Bosnia is not really working to keep the 33%


and ethnic cleansing will ultimately get their way.

peace, and it does not look as if it will work in the foreseeable future. Therefore, the US might as well withdraw its troops now.

Growing Perception of Success

Results from several poll questions suggest that a paramount factor in the rise of support for the operation is a growing perception that the operation is succeeding in securing peace. Back in September 1997, a Pew poll found that a solid majority of 61% felt that the Bosnia operation had *not* "improved the chances of finding a way to permanently end the fighting there," while only 27% felt that it had. The same question was asked in the current PIPA poll: the number feeling that the operation has not improved the chances for peace dropped 18 points to 43%, while the number feeling that the operation has improved the chances jumped 22 points to a plurality of 49%. Also, as mentioned above, only 33% found convincing the argument that "the operation in Bosnia is not really working to keep the peace...Therefore, the US might as well withdraw its troops now" (64%: unconvincing).


There are a number of possible reasons for this dramatic shift. President Clinton's Christmas visit to Bosnia portrayed the operation in a new and more positive light. Also the news from Bosnia has been generally good: since October numerous indictees have been delivered to the war crimes tribunal in the Hague, and the Bosnian Serbs have elected a new leadership that is supportive of the Dayton accords.



Persisting Dissatisfaction

Although there seems to be a growing majority that supports the choice to have US troops in Bosnia, there is, nonetheless, still a widespread dissatisfaction with the performance of the operation. When respondents were given a question that allowed them to differentiate their feelings about the operation's performance from their attitude about US participation, a strong majority expressed dissatisfaction. Respondents were given three options to choose from to describe their attitude. Just 26% chose the option: "I think the operation in Bosnia is going fairly well, and would support continuing US participation." Sixty-nine percent chose one of the two options that expressed dissatisfaction. The largest number- 43%- said: "I am not satisfied with the way the operation in Bosnia is going, but I think it would be a mistake for the US to pull out its troops now." Twenty-six percent chose the more unequivocal option: "I am opposed to continuing participation in the operation in Bosnia." Another question, with a different sample, also offered three options and revealed dissatisfaction with the conduct of the operation. Only 43% said that they felt the NATO peacekeeping forces should "stay the course they are on," while 51% opted for a changed approach: 32% wanted the peacekeeping forces to "get tougher," while 20% favored withdrawal.

This level of dissatisfaction, though, is down considerably from what it was for the UN peacekeeping operation that preceded the NATO operation. When the same question was asked in April 1995, only 13% wanted the UN to "stay the course." Twenty-nine percent wanted it to "withdraw," while the largest number-50%- wanted the UN peacekeeping force to "get tougher."



2. A majority supports extending the NATO mission beyond June 1998 and contributing US troops beyond this date.


A crucial issue- distinct from the issue of public support for the current operation- is how the public looks on the extension of the NATO operation into the future. Asked whether the "the current NATO peacekeeping operation in Bosnia should be continued or ended," 58% said they thought it should be continued while only 35% said they thought it should be ended. Respondents were then asked whether

they would favor continuing to contribute troops to the operation beyond June 1998. In this case, 57% said they favored doing so.

This finding also indicates an upward trend. When Pew asked in September 1997 about extending the mission, if necessary, to keep the peace, a plurality of 48% said they would support it, while 46% were opposed. In October Louis Harris found only 40% thought Congress should approve a request to extend the mission past June.

Another recent poll question also found lower support for extending the mission, but this one underscored that the troops were "originally scheduled to be withdrawn by June" and that Clinton had decided to keep them "beyond that deadline." Both Gallup in December and Pew in January found that only 43% approved of the decision, while 50% disapproved. But because respondents were asked to react directly to the failure to meet the deadline, it may be they were expressing their dissatisfaction with this failure more than their preferred policy option.

3. Misperceptions about the Bosnia operation are widespread in the American public. A strong majority believes that significant numbers of American troops are being killed by hostile fire. Only a minority is aware that the shooting war has stopped and that most Bosnians support the NATO operation. All of these misperceptions significantly diminish the perception that the operation is succeeding, which in turn lowers support for US participation.



A strong majority believes that American troops have been killed in Bosnia. When asked, "Is it your impression that American soldiers have or have not been killed by hostile fire in Bosnia over the last year?," almost a two-thirds majority-63%- said that Americans have been killed. In reality, no Americans have been killed by hostile fire. Only 22% of respondents knew this, while 15% could not answer the question.

Among those who said American soldiers have been killed, when asked to estimate how many have been killed over the last year, the median estimate was 25 deaths. A substantial number of respondents also gave estimates in the hundreds, so that the average estimate of US fatalities was 172.

Only a minority of Americans is aware that the fighting in Bosnia has stopped. Asked whether "in Bosnia now the factions are actively fighting a war, or has the combat stopped?," only 42% said that the combat had stopped. Forty-one percent said the war is still going on, and 17% could not say. Thus it appears that a majority (58%) is, at the least, unsure whether the NATO operation has been successful in maintaining the peace in Bosnia.

Among those who said the war is still going on, when asked to estimate how many people were being killed each month, the median estimate was 100. A substantial number gave estimates in the thousands, so the mean estimate was even higher - 527 killed.

Only a minority is aware that most Bosnians support the NATO operation. Asked "is it your impression that most Bosnians support the NATO operation or that that most Bosnians want NATO to leave?" only 46% answered correctly that most Bosnians support the operation. A substantial minority of 35% believe most Bosnians want NATO to leave while 19% could not give an answer. Thus, a majority (54%) is at least unsure of whether most Bosnians back NATO efforts.

All of these misperceptions have a significant impact on the perception of the success of the mission. Among those who know that the war has stopped, the percentage saying the operation is succeeding was 15 points higher than for those who said the war is still going on or said they did not know. Among those who know that Americans are not being killed, belief that the operation is succeeding is 17 points higher. Among those who know that most Bosnians support the operation, belief in success is 16 points higher.

The perception of success, in turn, has a dramatic impact on the readiness to support US participation in the operation. Among those who believe that the operation is succeeding, 79% favor participation as compared to 47% among those who think it is not. Among those who believe the operation is succeeding, 80% support extending the mission, while among those who think it is not, only 31% favor extension.

There is also evidence that giving people information about the fact that the war has stopped affects attitudes. At the end of the questionnaire a subsample of respondents were presented an argument that contained the assertion that the presence of NATO has stopped the killing. Among those who heard it, support for extending the operation was 18 points higher than for those who did not hear it.

The perception of support from the Bosnian population also has a powerful effect on attitudes about continuing the mission. Asked "If most Bosnians want NATO to leave, should NATO including the US leave or stay?", a majority of 59% said NATO should leave.

Bosnian Support for NATO Mission

According to polls conducted by the United States Information Agency, the majority of Bosnians is supportive of the NATO operation. In USIA's most recent poll in February 1998 the majority of Bosnians overall (75%) as well as all ethnic groups (67% of Serbs, 73% of Croats and 94% Muslims) said they support the Dayton peace accords -- the basis of the NATO operation. When asked about the presence of the NATO-led peacekeeping force, 68% said they were supportive (50% of Serbs, 59% of Croats and 96% of Muslims).

4. Most Americans significantly overestimate the portion of troops the US contributes to the Bosnia operation, leading most Americans to feel that the US is doing more than its fair share and driving down support for US participation. However, an overwhelming majority say that they would find acceptable the actual portion the US contributes.

When asked, "What is your hunch about what percentage of the troops in the peacekeeping operation are American?" the mean response was 53%. This is up from a median of 40% when PIPA asked this question in June 1996 and a mean of 45% when Louis Harris asked the question in October 1997.

In fact, at the beginning of the operation, the US contributed one-third of the troops. Throughout 1997 the US percentage was approximately 25%, while the US portion will be cut to 21% after June. The lion's share of the remainder has been supplied by Western European countries. In the current poll, 67% of respondents estimated a US contribution above 25%.


Apparently most Americans are rather unhappy about the portion they perceive the US contributing. When asked whether "In the NATO operation in Bosnia - as compared to the US, do you think the Europeans are carrying their fair share?," 67% say the Europeans are carrying less than their fair share, while only 21% say the Europeans are carrying their fair share.

However, it appears that this feeling is largely derived from the above mentioned misperception. When asked what share the US should be contributing, the median response among those who thought the US should contribute some was 30% (mean 34%). Adding in those who said "none," the median was 20% (mean 23%). Among those who answered, only 32% said the US should not contribute any troops, while 68% favored contributing some.

More dramatically, an overwhelming percentage of respondents said that if the proportion of US troops was closer to what they thought it should be - and in fact will be according to current NATO plans - then they would support US participation in an extension of the mission. Presented the following question:

Presently there is some discussion about extending the NATO peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. If our European allies and some other countries would provide 75% of the troops for this extended mission, should the US be willing or should the US not be willing to contribute 25%?

An overwhelming 78% of respondents said the US should be willing, while only 18% said it should not.



5. A very strong majority favors the NATO forces actively seeking to arrest Bosnian leaders charged with war crimes, even when reminded that this could put US troops at risk.

Respondents were presented the following:

There is a controversy about whether the NATO force in Bosnia should seek out and arrest the two Bosnian Serb leaders who have been charged with war crimes and turn them over to the World Court. Some say that the NATO force should arrest these leaders because they are responsible for the systematic killing of thousands of civilians. Others say that such an effort might lead to armed conflict as in Somalia, and some American troops might be killed.

A very strong majority of 73% said they favored (45% strongly) "having the NATO force carry out these arrests" - up from 70% in June 1996. Only 19% were opposed (down from 24%).

6. In the event that US troops are killed in the course of the peacekeeping operation, it is unlikely that most Americans would want to withdraw US troops.

Naturally, a key question is how Americans are likely to respond in the event that US troops are killed in the course of the peacekeeping operation. It is widely assumed that if a conflict resulted in a significant number of American fatalities, the public would want to withdraw American troops. A variety of evidence suggests that this would likely not be the case.

Respondents were asked to:

... imagine that at some point NATO peacekeeping troops have a confrontation with an organized group resisting the Dayton peace agreement. Imagine that this confrontation becomes violent and some NATO

troops are killed, including 20 Americans. Imagine that you saw the bodies of the Americans on television.

They were then asked what they thought they would want to do under these circumstances, and were given four choices. Only a small minority - 15% - said that they would want to withdraw all American troops. Sixteen percent said they would want to "stay the course." A plurality of 34% chose to "strike back hard at the attackers," while another 28% chose to bring in reinforcements - making a 61% majority who preferred an assertive response.

However, the most dramatic evidence on Americans' attitudes toward fatalities is that 63% of Americans believe that a significant number of American soldiers have already been killed, and yet support for the operation is higher than it was at the beginning of the operation.

Chapter 5: Economic Sanctions

1. A strong and consistent majority supports the use of economic sanctions against Iran and Libya to pressure them to stop supporting terrorists and pursuing weapons of mass destruction. This support is resilient even when faced with the arguments that unilateral embargoes are ineffective, that economic engagement is a more effective means to create change and that embargoes primarily hurt the masses.

Respondents were introduced to the current debate about sanctions on Iran and Libya with the following statement:

Currently there is a controversy about how the US should deal with the fact that Iran and Libya are believed to be supporting terrorists and trying to develop weapons of mass destruction. So as to pressure Iran and Libya to change this behavior, the US has refused to trade with these countries. However, our European allies have continued to trade with them. There are a number of debates on this issue. I would like to know what you think about each one.

The first debate explored was whether sanctions should be imposed unilaterally. Respondents were asked to choose between two arguments. An overwhelming 75% opted for the argument that the US should impose sanctions on Iran and Libya "whether or not our allies do."

Box 1: *Support for Sanctions Even if by US Alone*

<u>Argument</u>	<u>Preferred by:</u>
<i>We should only refuse to trade with Iran and Libya if our European allies will also refuse, because otherwise it will not really do any good.</i>	21%
<i>We should refuse to trade with Iran and Libya, whether or not our allies do, because it is the right thing to do and eventually our allies might follow our example.</i>	75%

Another debate explored was whether it is better to pursue a policy of economic engagement rather than sanctions. A majority of 57% rejected the argument in favor of engagement and opted instead for the argument that it is necessary to impose costs through sanctions. Support for the pro-sanctions argument was even stronger - 61% - when the US position in favor of sanctions was identified to respondents before presenting the arguments. (See Box 2.)

Another sample responded similarly to questions specifically about Iran. Presented with two arguments, 56% said they agreed most with the statement that "economic sanctions are the most effective way to stop Iran from supporting terrorism and acquiring a nuclear capability." Thirty-one percent opted for the argument that "maintaining political and trade ties with Iran is a more effective way to influence their government." When another sample was told what the US and European positions were, 63% favored the sanctions while just 24% favored political and trade ties.

Box 2: Rejection of Economic Engagement Argument

Argument

Preferred
by:

Experience has shown that refusing to trade with countries rarely leads them to change. Furthermore, by trading with Iran and Libya we can maintain a relationship with them that 36%/25% creates opportunities to exert a positive influence.*

Just trading and talking with Iran and Libya cause them to change. It is only when autocratic leaders like these see that there are costs for their behavior that they will 57%/61% change. Refusing to trade with these countries imposes such costs.*

** US position identified*

Respondents were even more unequivocal in rejecting the argument that sanctions only hurt the masses in Iran and Libya. Sixty-eight percent rejected the argument that sanctions "will just hurt the masses...without affecting the people on top," opting instead for sanctions. When another sample was first informed that the US has already imposed sanctions on Iran and Libya, support for sanctions was even higher-79%. (See Box 3.)

Box 3: Support Undeterred by Concern for Masses

Argument

Preferred
by:

*Refusing to trade with Iran and Libya will just hurt the masses of average people there, without affecting the people on top who make the decisions that cause the problem. So sanctions don't work and just create harm. 23%/15%**


It is unfortunate that the average people have to suffer because of the choices made by their leaders. But stopping the support of terrorists and the pursuit of weapons of destruction is so 68%/79% important that it is necessary to try to put pressure on these average people to try to get their government to change.*

** US position identified*

2. Support for the embargo on Cuba is quite soft: the majority in support is slight, and when presented with arguments for and against the embargo, a slight majority opposes it. Also, a

majority favors moderating the embargo to allow food and medicine, and is now supportive of reestablishing diplomatic relations.

In contrast to the embargo on Iran and Libya, support for the embargo on Cuba is quite soft. A trend line question first used by CBS in October 1996 found 56% support. Around the time of the Pope's visit (January 1998), CBS found that support had dropped to 46%, while Time/CNN in a similar question found 48% support. The current PIPA poll re-asked the CBS question quoted above, and found that support had recovered somewhat to 53%. (See Box 4.)



Another key indication of the softness of support is that when respondents were asked to deliberate on the issue by evaluating pro and con arguments, a slight majority found more convincing the argument *against* the embargo on Cuba. Presented with two arguments, in the current PIPA poll only 40% found most convincing the argument in support of the embargo that the embargo presses Cuba to be "more democratic and improve its human rights record." A slight majority of 52% opted for the argument critical of the embargo, which stressed that "the embargo has been opposed by almost all members of the UN, including our European allies, and by the Pope." (See Box 5.)

Box 5: *With Deliberation Support for Cuban Embargo Erodes*

<u>Argument</u>	<u>Preferred by:</u>
<i>The embargo puts pressure on Cuba to make its government more democratic and improve its human rights record. Therefore it's a good idea and the right thing to do.</i>	40%

The embargo has been opposed by almost all members of the UN, including our European allies, and by the Pope. With all these other countries continuing to trade with Cuba, the 52% embargo is ineffective and just isolates the US.

Moderating the Embargo

A majority also favors the idea of moderating the embargo on Cuba. Presented with two arguments, 59% found more convincing a humanitarian argument that the embargo should be moderated to allow the sale of food and medicine. Thirty-five percent opted for the argument that moderating the embargo would undermine the pressure for change. (See Box 6.)

Box 6: Moderating Cuban Embargo Supported

Argument

Preferred
by:


The embargo has made food and medicine less available to the poor people in Cuba who are already suffering under Castro. For humanitarian reasons the US should make an exception 59% and allow the sale of food and medicine.

Moderating the embargo to allow the sale of food and medicine will weaken the embargo and make the Cuban people more comfortable with the existing situation. This will only 35% strengthen Castro and delay the necessary changes in Cuba.

Establishing Diplomatic Relations

A majority now supports reestablishing diplomatic relations with Cuba. In April 1996, Gallup found only 40% in favor of "reestablishing diplomatic relations with Cuba." In January 1998, around the time of the Pope's visit, support was up to 55%(CBS) in a nearly identical question. When the current PIPA poll asked a question identical to Gallup's, support stayed steady at 56%. (See Box 7.)

Box 7: Diplomatic Relations with Cuba Now Supported



This support for reestablishing diplomatic relations may, however, be soft. In a January 1998 ABC poll that recounted the history of the breaking of diplomatic, trade and travel relations in response to Cuba becoming "a communist country under Fidel Castro in 1959," a 56% majority opposed establishing diplomatic relations, while just 38% favored it. For some respondents, such a question may have elicited support for the embargo historically, rather than measuring support for current options. Nonetheless, it suggests that support for reestablishing diplomatic relations can be deflected rather easily.

3. In principle, a strong majority opposes penalizing countries that continue to trade with Iran, Libya or Cuba (i.e., extraterritorial sanctions). When told that doing so is now American law, support is higher but still a minority position.

The idea of extraterritorial sanctions is not popular with the public. When asked to choose between two arguments on extraterritorial sanctions regarding Iran and Libya, only 32% chose the one that favored it, while 62% opted for the argument that doing so is "too high-handed." When another sample was told that such extraterritorial sanctions are already in fact US law, support rose to 45%: even so, a plurality of 50% was opposed. (See Box 8.)

Support for extraterritorial measures in relation to Cuba is even lower. Asked to choose between two arguments, only 19% agreed that:

- If other countries continue to trade with Cuba, the embargo will not be effective. Therefore, we should penalize countries that trade with Cuba to pressure them to join the embargo.

Box 8: Low Support for Extraterritorial Sanctions Re: Iran and Libya (D'Amato Act)

<u>Argument</u>	<u>Preferred by:</u>
<i>To put pressure on our European allies to stop trading with Iran and Libya, we should penalize those European countries by restricting their ability to do business with us.</i>	32%/45%*
<i>Putting pressure on our allies like this is too high-handed. We should each make our own decisions about how we want to deal with Iran and Libya.</i>	62%/50%*
<i>*Informed that measure is US law</i>	

An overwhelming 78% preferred the one that said:

We do not have the right to tell other countries what to do. Penalizing them for trading with Cuba is too high-handed and will create tensions with our allies.


Similarly, when ABC (January 1998), in a series of questions on the trade embargo, asked, "Do you think the United States should or should not impose economic penalties on other countries that do business with Cuba?", only 18% said that it should and 74% said it should not.

To determine the effect of information about the US legislation, PIPA reasked the Jan. 1998 ABC question with a preface that stated that "the US has passed legislation" imposing such economic penalties. In this case, support rose to 44%, though a slight majority of 52% was nonetheless opposed. (See Box 9.)

Box 9:

**Low Support for Extraterritorial Sanctions
Re: Cuba (Helms-Burton Act)**

Should US "impose economic penalties on other countries that do business with Cuba?"



Apparently what support there is for extraterritorial measures is also quite soft. When respondents are asked to choose among four different options, support for extraterritorial measures becomes quite low, even among those who were informed that such measures are US law. In regard to Iran and Libya, only 18% supported extraterritorial measures in principle and only 31% among those told it is US law. (see Box 10.) In regard to Cuba, only 14% said that the US should penalize countries that trade with Cuba. (See Box 11.)

Box 10: Overall Position on Iran and Libya

<u>Position</u>	<u>Preferred by:</u>
<i>We should refuse to trade with Iran and Libya whether or not our European allies do, but not penalize European allies who do not join with us.</i>	47%/38%*
<i>We should not refuse to trade with Iran and Libya, but should pursue other diplomatic means to try to get them to change.</i>	26%/25%*
<i>We should refuse to trade with Iran and Libya whether or not our European allies do, and we should penalize European allies who do not join with us.</i>	18%/31%*
<i>We should only refuse to trade with Iran and Libya if our European allies also refuse to trade with them.</i>	4%/4%*
*Informed of US law	

Box 11: Overall Position on Cuba

<u>Position</u>	<u>Preferred by:</u>
<i>The embargo should be moderated to allow the sale of food and medicine.</i>	37%
<i>The embargo should be maintained as it is, but the US should not penalize countries who trade with Cuba.</i>	27%
<i>The embargo should be lifted to allow normal trade between the US and Cuba.</i>	20%
<i>The embargo should be maintained as it is, and the US should penalize countries that trade with Cuba.</i>	14%

4. A strong majority is willing to have the European-American dispute about the Helms-Burton legislation decided by the World Trade Organization.

At the time the poll was being conducted, the European Union was preparing to bring a legal action before the World Trade Organization (WTO), which would have required the WTO to rule on whether the Helms-Burton Act was in conformity with international trade law. Within the US, there has been a controversy about whether the US should be willing to have the case adjudicated by the WTO. Apparently, most Americans feel that the US should be willing. In response to the following question:

European countries have argued that the US law that punishes citizens of other countries for doing business in Cuba violates international trade law, and the Europeans want this case decided by the World Trade Organization, of which the US and Europe are both members. Do you think the US should or should not agree to have this case decided by the World Trade Organization?

63% said the US should agree, while 33% said it should not.

Chapter 6: Global Warming

For some time now, the countries of the EU have favored a more aggressive approach to the problem of global warming than has the US. At the December 1997 international conference on climate change in Kyoto, Japan, the United States and the European Union arrived with a number of diverging positions about what goals should be set for collective action on global warming. Most prominently, the European Union proposed much more ambitious goals for cutting greenhouse gas emissions than did the US. The US proposed the standard of cutting emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2010 while the EU proposed cutting 15% below 1990 levels. Ultimately, the US and other participants in the conference agreed on cuts of 6-8%. However, the prospects for US Senate ratification of a treaty with such a standard are highly doubtful.

Another key controversy centers around the question of whether the developing countries also will be required to limit their emissions as part of the treaty. At the Kyoto conference and in prior negotiations, many developing countries took the position that they should be exempt from a future regime to lower emissions. This argument was based on the fact that their greenhouse gas emissions per capita are much lower than those of developed countries and that global warming is largely due to the historical emissions of the developed countries.

The US has taken the position that because the developing countries in the future will contribute a significant and growing portion of emissions, they should share in the responsibility to deal with global warming. The EU has been relatively more sympathetic to the view of the developing countries that they should be exempt from restrictions on emissions because their emissions per capita are so much lower than those of the industrialized countries. The US Senate has passed a non-binding resolution stating that the US should not sign any agreement that requires reductions by the US and other industrialized countries, but does not require reductions by developing countries.


Yet another issue of US-EU dissension centers around the question of whether to establish an international system for trading emissions permits. A central element in the US position on global warming has been that such a system must be developed, in order to allow the market to allocate resources efficiently toward alleviating the problem. Both the European Union and developing countries have been highly dubious about such a trading system. The Kyoto Treaty includes a general clause that opens the way to further negotiations on market mechanisms, but no agreements have been concluded.

American Public Attitudes

1. An overwhelming majority of the US public embraces the idea that global warming is a real problem that requires action. However, this majority divides on the question of whether efforts should be restricted to low-cost steps or should also include steps with significant costs.

PIPA asked respondents to choose from among three statements about "what the countries of the world, including the US, should do about the problem of global warming." One statement expressed an argument frequently made by political, business, and scientific figures who are skeptical about the overall trend of global warming research: "Until we are sure that global warming is really a problem, we should not take any steps that would have economic costs." This position was overwhelmingly rejected, with only 15% embracing it.

Eighty-three percent instead chose one of two statements that described global warming as a real problem requiring attention. Forty-four percent preferred the statement, "The problem of global warming should be addressed, but its effects will be gradual, so we can deal with the problem gradually by taking steps that are low in cost." Slightly fewer-39%-chose, "Global warming is a serious and pressing problem. We should begin taking steps now even if this involves significant costs." Thus, while a plurality appears to favor a gradual, low-cost approach, nearly as many say they would rather take more significant steps now - while only a small minority is responsive to the argument that since the science is uncertain, action should be deferred.



Consistent with these findings, a New York Times poll of November 1997 found that only 13% thought "global warming won't have a serious impact at all," while 43% thought "the impact of global warming won't happen until sometime in the future" and 23% thought that it is "causing a serious impact now."

Those who thought global warming's impact would happen in the future were then asked whether it was necessary or not to "take steps to counter the effects of global warming right away." Eighty-one percent of this group (35% of the full sample) thought immediate steps were necessary - making 58% of the full sample who viewed global warming as either having a serious impact already, or requiring immediate efforts. Similarly, a Mellman Group poll (September 1997) found that 50% thought "global warming is an environmental problem that is happening now," while 24% thought it would happen in the future and only 10% thought "global warming will not happen."

Other polls also have found a significant willingness to incur costs toward reducing global warming even when the cost is quantified in concrete terms. In a September 1997 poll by the Mellman Group, majorities were willing to pay an extra \$5 (80%), \$10 (72%), or \$20 (61%) monthly "to buy environmentally clean energy such as solar and wind power from your electric utility company in order to cut down on emissions of carbon dioxide and reduce the threat of global warming." Similarly, a September 1997 Ohio State University National Survey found that 68% said they were willing to pay more for energy to reduce pollution, with 51% volunteering an amount of \$10 or more per month. A November 1997 Pew Center

poll even found 73% willing to pay 5 cents a gallon more for gasoline, and 60% willing to pay 25 cents more. The Mellman Group, however, found lower support for gas tax increases.

Awareness High for Global Warming, But Not For Kyoto Conference

Awareness of the global warming issue is relatively high. In a New York Times November 1997 poll, 65% said they had heard "a lot" (27%) or "some" (38%) about global warming, while only 34% said they had heard "not much" (20%) or "nothing" (14%) about the issue. However, awareness of the Kyoto conference itself was not widespread. In PIPA's study, just 25% had heard "a great deal" (5%) or "some" (20%) about the Kyoto conference, while 74% had heard "not very much" (39%) or "nothing at all" (35%).

2. A strong majority of Americans are supportive of the level of cuts proposed in the Kyoto Treaty, even when informed that the US had originally sought less deep cuts. When asked to specify their preferences more precisely, a plurality leans toward setting reduction goals that are more challenging than those agreed upon in Kyoto, even when informed of the US position.

The Kyoto agreement was described to respondents as follows:

At the conference there was a dispute about how much to reduce the emission of gasses that produce global warming. The debate was about how much the industrialized countries should commit to reduce their emissions by about the year 2010. [Some] [The US] wanted to see reductions to the level these countries were emitting in 1990. [Others] [The European Union] wanted to see reductions of 15% below the levels these countries were emitting in 1990. At the conference in Kyoto, it was agreed that most industrialized countries would reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 7-8% below 1990 levels. As noted, for half the sample the differing positions were described as the positions of "some" and "others." While for the other half, they were described as positions of the US (1990 levels) and the EU (15% below 1990 levels).


Among the half-sample who did not hear the US and EU positions identified, only 9% thought that the treaty's reductions in emissions are too deep; 30% thought they are not deep enough; and 49% thought the agreement is about right. Among the half-sample who heard the US and EU positions identified, support for the US position that had wanted less deep reductions in emissions was 21%, support for the EU position that had sought deeper cuts was 29%, and 44% thought the agreement was "about right."

Thus a strong majority expressed support for the Kyoto Treaty even when informed that it called for significantly deeper cuts than the original US position. Among those not informed of the US position 79% said the Treaty was either "about right" or "not deep enough." Among those who were informed, 73% held these positions.

These findings are consistent with a poll question asked by the Mellman Group before the Kyoto conference, which asked about a proposal for an international agreement on emissions cuts: "It has been proposed that the nations of the world agree to reduce their CO2 emissions by 20% by the year 2005 in order to significantly slow down the rate of global warming." Seventy-two percent said they favor this proposal, while 9% said they opposed it (don't know: 19%).

Specifying Preferred Levels: Comparing US and European Positions.

To get a more precise understanding of Americans' preferences regarding cuts, respondents who said that the Kyoto Treaty was "about right" were asked in a follow-on question which way they leaned. Among those who did not have the US and EU positions identified, 8% (of the total sample) said they leaned toward feeling the reductions were too deep, raising the total to 17%; while 18% said they were not deep enough, raising the total to 48%. Twenty-three percent held to the view that the reductions are "about right." Among those who were informed of the US and EU positions, 20% migrated to the "too deep" position, raising the total to 40%; 14% migrated to the "not deep enough" position, raising the total to 43%; while 10% held to the "about right" position.




Thus, even when the US position was identified, a plurality of 43% leaned in favor of the European position calling for deeper cuts, though not quite as high as the 48% leaning in that direction when the positions were not identified. However, when the positions were identified, support for the position calling for less deep cuts was dramatically higher (41%) than when the US position was not identified (17%).

3. A majority believes that the developing countries should be expected to limit their greenhouse gas emissions as part of an international treaty limiting emissions. If the developing countries are willing to limit their emissions, an overwhelming majority would support the developed countries providing technology and training to help make the emissions cuts possible.

Respondents were told that: "Another controversy is whether the less economically developed countries should also be expected to cut their emissions of the greenhouse gasses that cause global warming." Respondents were then offered a choice between two statements. One statement presented the position taken by many developing countries: "On a per person basis, less-developed countries produce far less greenhouse gases than developed countries. Therefore, the less-developed countries should not be

required to limit their emissions until they develop their economies more." Only a minority - 38 % - chose this statement. A majority of 55% preferred the opposing argument: "The less-developed countries produce a substantial and growing amount of greenhouse gases. Therefore, they should be required to limit their emissions."

Respondents were then asked, "If the less-developed countries are willing to limit their emissions, do you think the developed countries should provide the technology and training necessary to help them make their industries less polluting?" A nearly unanimous 90% said that the developed countries should provide this technology and training (should not: 7%) (See Box 3).



4. A solid majority rejects the idea of creating a market for trading emissions permits as a way of trying to reduce emissions-at least in the forms that are currently proposed.

PIPA presented the concept of emissions trading in the following way:

At the global warming conference, countries discussed whether there should be an international system of trading emission permits. In such a system, a country which reduces its emissions even more than promised gets credits it can sell. Other countries could buy these credits instead of reducing their own emissions. Some say this system is a good idea, because it would encourage reductions to happen wherever they can be done most cheaply and efficiently. Others say it is a bad idea, because it would allow rich countries to pay for reducing emissions abroad while doing less to reduce them at home. Do you think it would be better to have this system or not to have this system?

Only 30% (10% strongly) thought it would be better to have a system of trading emission permits, with a majority of 61% rejecting it (36% strongly).

This is consistent with findings from earlier polls. In Mellman Group's September 1997 poll, respondents were presented with a list of possible means to deal with global warming. One proposal was for the UN to "establish a worldwide limit on carbon dioxide emissions that is lower than current levels," with each member country "allocated the right to discharge a certain amount ... Countries could buy and sell these pollution rights to one another. This would allow them to choose between reducing their carbon dioxide emissions or paying to continue to pollute." Fifty-six percent opposed this idea, with 32% in favor.

Domestic emissions trading systems do not do much better. In the Mellman poll, when a proposal was presented for having a US domestic emissions trading rights system, support was about the same-57% were opposed and 29% in favor.

However, other poll questions show Americans expressing more uncertainty about how they feel about such trading rights regimes. In a November 1997 New York Times poll respondents were presented the idea of a domestic trading rights system as follows:

The government would issue permits that allow companies to give off a certain amount of greenhouse gasses. Companies that do better than required would be allowed to sell at a profit their leftover permits to companies that do worse than required. These permits would give companies a financial reason to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gasses. Do you think that is a good idea, a bad idea, or don't you know enough about it to say?

Forty-nine percent said they didn't know enough, 15% thought it a good idea, and 17% a bad idea.

Also, when asked to choose between a trading rights system and the standard alternative of a government regulatory approach, the public does not take a clear position. The September 1997 Mellman Group poll asked, "In trying to reduce the threat of global warming, do you think we should rely mainly on strict regulations to limit emissions of carbon dioxide, or do you think we should rely mainly on incentives that will cause the free market to discourage carbon dioxide pollution?" Neither way on majority support. Thirty-seven percent chose "strict regulations," while 32% chose market incentives (9% undecided, 21% don't know).

Comparisons with European Public

1. Based on limited data, Europeans are generally more definite in their belief that global warming is a serious problem, and more accepting of the idea that dealing with it may require significant costs, than are Americans. However, on more general environmental questions, Americans are slightly more committed to environmental concerns.

Unfortunately, a paucity of evidence exists regarding European attitudes on global warming. In 1997 the Environics Research Group conducted an international survey called the International Environmental Monitor in 24 countries that included a question on global warming. It presented just two options: rejecting taking major action until more is known about the problem, or taking major action based on assuming the worst. In the four major European countries, majorities took the proactive position, while the US was evenly divided. While this does show that Americans are less definite in the support for action on global warming, it should be noted (as discussed above) that when Americans are given a middle option of taking more moderate steps, only a very small minority chooses the option of taking no action.

Box 4: Europeans More Ready to Take Major Action on Global Warming

"Some people say that we should not take major Actions to reduce impacts on climate until we know more, because of the great economic costs involved. Others say we should assume the worst and take major action now to reduce human impacts on climate, even if there are major costs. Which one of these points of view best reflects your own?"

	<u>France</u>	<u>Germany</u>	<u>Britain</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>US</u>
Not take action	15%	25%	32%	16%	46%
Take Action	74%	71%	52%	71%	46%
Neither/depends	5%	2%	10%	7%	6%

Similar results were found in the International Social Survey Program's 1993 Environment Survey, conducted in 19 countries by a consortium of national institutes. Respondents were asked how serious they "think that a rise in the world's temperature caused by the 'greenhouse effect' is." Of eight Atlantic countries polled, the US ranked seventh in terms of the percentage saying that global warming is extremely or very dangerous for the environment.

Box 5: Europeans More Inclined to See Global Warming as Dangerous

"Do you think a rise in the world's temperature caused by the 'greenhouse effect' is...?"

Percentage saying "extremely" or "very" dangerous for the environment:

West Germany	80	Britain	54
Italy	71	Norway	49
Spain	68	US	46
Ireland	58	Netherlands	40

However, when adding in those who say that the problem is "somewhat dangerous," the differences between the US and Europeans become less stark, with 84% of Americans and 82 to 97% of the Europeans saying the problem is at least somewhat dangerous.

On other more general environmental questions in the 1997 Enviroics study, the Americans were slightly more committed to addressing environmental problems. Asked, "How concerned are you personally about environmental problems?", German, French, British, and Italian respondents answered similarly, on average 30% saying "a great deal," 51% "a fair amount," and 19% "little" or "none." Americans showed slightly higher concern with 37% saying "a great deal," 52% "a fair amount," and 11% "little" or "none." Asked if they would "give part of their income if ... certain the money would be used to prevent environmental pollution," the Europeans averaged 67% in agreement (with the French bringing up the rear at 56%), while 72% of Americans agreed. Asked whether they think the higher priority should be "protecting the environment" or "economic growth," Europeans averaged 64% saying environmental protection should be the higher priority, while 69% of Americans took that position.

2. Europeans are more inclined than Americans to see the industrialized countries as being more responsible for today's environmental problems.

As discussed above, a key issue in the global warming debate is whether the industrialized countries, because they have been the primary generators of greenhouse gasses, should be singularly responsible for reducing such emissions or if the developing countries should also take some responsibility.

Consistent with their governments' positions, in response to a general question about today's environmental problems in the 1997 Enviro-nics study, Europeans are more inclined to lay the responsibility at the door of the industrialized countries.

Box 6: Europeans See Industrialized Nations as More Responsible

"Which nations do you think are more responsible for today's environmental problems?"

	<u>France</u>	<u>Germany</u>	<u>Britain</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Euro Avg.</u>	<u>US</u>
<i>Industrialized</i>	49%	56%	37%	56%	50%	28%
<i>Developing</i>	5%	3%	9%	4%	5%	8%
<i>Both</i>	41%	40%	50%	37%	42%	62%

Chapter 7: European-American Trade

1. Presently, most Americans believe that the US is more open to European goods than Europe is to American goods. However, among these, most feel that it would hurt more than help the US to put up trade barriers to European products.


When asked "Please tell me your hunch: which is more open to imported goods from the other?", 71% said the US, while 21% said Western Europe. An overwhelming 86% said the US makes it very (36%) or fairly (50%) easy for European companies "to sell their manufactured products" in the US. Just 41% said Western European countries make it very (6%) or fairly (35%) easy, while another 41% said the Europeans make it fairly difficult. Among another sample, 74% agreed with the statement, "In general European countries do not let in American goods as much as America lets in European goods" (20% disagreed).

However, only a small minority felt that this imbalance should lead the US to put up trade barriers. The 74% who agreed that the US is more open were asked to choose between two statements. A majority of this group -55%-chose the statement, "Putting up barriers against European products would ultimately not be best for the US." Just 38% of this group opted for the statement, "It would be in the best interest of the US to put up more barriers against European products." Thus, only 28% of the whole sample favored a protectionist response.

2. The majority of Americans would support a reciprocal lowering of trade barriers with the European Union, even though a plurality believes, mistakenly, that labor standards are lower in Europe than in the US.

Americans appear to be quite open to a reciprocal lowering of trade barriers with the European Union. Asked, "If the countries of the European Union say they will lower barriers to products from the US if we

will lower our barriers to their products," a strong majority of 64% said the US should agree to do so, while 28% said it should not. (See Box 12.)




This is part of a broader positive orientation to lowering trade barriers, though it is tempered by concerns about wage competition. Using a question similar to the one above, 66% said they would support a reciprocal lowering of trade barriers as a general principle. Sixty-four percent even favored doing so with countries described as "poorer than the US." Support was sharply lower, however, when the question was posed as negotiating reduced trade barriers with countries "with low wages": only 43% favored this, with a plurality of 48% opposed.

Interestingly, this support for lowering trade barriers with Europe is strong despite the fact that a plurality mistakenly believes that labor standards are lower in Europe than in the US. If true, this might make Europe an attractive haven for jobs. Forty-eight percent said that it is their impression "that standards for labor conditions" are lower in Europe, while just 18% said they were higher in Europe (same 25%). (See Box 13.) What is striking is that if labor standards were in fact lower in Europe, lowering trade barriers might make it attractive for US corporations to move their operations (and jobs) there. However, respondents did not seem highly concerned about this prospect as support for removing trade barriers was, nonetheless, high.

Box 13: Europe's Labor Standards Perceived as Lower

Percent Perceiving European Labor Standards as:



A very slight plurality (35%) also had the perception that "standards for protecting the environment" are lower in Europe. Just 21% said they are higher while 34% said that they are about the same. In fact, overall European environmental standards are not sharply different from those of the US. The strong support for the mutual lowering of trade barriers with Europe, despite the widespread misperception of lower labor standards (and, to a lesser extent, environmental standards) in Europe, suggests that the majority of Americans would likely support a reduction in trade barriers as contemplated in current discussions.